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1 Introduction
Why do some firms grow faster than others? While some producers rapidly expand
after entry, many others do not survive the first few years. After some time however,
those surviving firms account for a large share of sales on both domestic or foreign markets
(Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2009; Eaton et al., 2008). In the case of French
firms, those that did not serve foreign markets a decade earlier account for 53.5 percent of
total foreign sales, of which 40 percent comes from post-entry growth.1 Understanding the
sources of heterogeneity in post-entry firm dynamics – survival and growth – is therefore
crucial to explain the dynamics of aggregate sales and firm size distribution.
Firm dynamics are characterized by a number of systematic patterns, which have been
documented by a large body of empirical literature. New firms start small and have higher
exit rates. For those that survive, the average growth of their sales declines with their
age.2 These facts can be rationalized by several theories, relying on different underlying
mechanisms such as stochastic productivity growth, endogenous R&D investment, financial
constraints, adjustment costs, demand accumulation or demand learning. Yet, empirically,
disentangling the role of these specific channels has proven difficult, as it requires identifying
separately the contributions of idiosyncratic demand and productivity to the variations of
firms sales. For this reason, the literature has followed an indirect approach: it has studied
which models are able to replicate the behavior of observables such as sales growth and exit.
In contrast, this paper directly tests for the existence of demand learning by identifying
firms’ beliefs about demand and the signals they receive, and shows that it is an important
driver of post-entry firm dynamics.
We first document two novel stylized facts using detailed data from the French customs
containing information on firms’ sales by destination and 6-digit product between 1994
and 2005. Throughout the paper, we refer to a product-destination pair as a market, and
define age as the tenure of a firm in a specific market. We show that existing results
about aggregate firm behavior carry over at the firm-market level. More precisely, sales
growth, exit rates and the variance of sales growth within cohort all decrease with the age
of the firm in its market. Importantly, these patterns are still present after controlling for
firm-market size or conditioning on firm-product-year fixed effects. In addition, we find
that the market-specific growth paths after entry are highly heterogeneous across firms:
while entrants grow on average in their first years, a significant share of survivors exhibit
negative post-entry growth in the markets they serve. For instance, around 40% of the
firms that enter a market in 1996 and stay until 2005 sell less at the end of the period than
in their second year.
We then present a standard model with Bayesian demand learning in the spirit of
1These numbers are based on the 1996-2005 period – see online appendix, Section B.
2See Evans (1987), Dunne et al. (1989), Cabral and Mata (2003), Haltiwanger et al. (2013) among
many others. Eaton et al. (2008), Buono and Fadinger (2012), Berthou and Vicard (2015), or Ruhl and
Willis (2017) show that these dynamics are also observed for exporters.
Jovanovic (1982) that can rationalize these facts.3 Firms operate under monopolistic com-
petition and face CES demand, but at the same time are uncertain about their idiosyncratic
demand in each market, and learn as noisy information arrives in each period. These sig-
nals determine the firms’ posterior beliefs about demand, on which they base their quantity
decision. A higher than expected signal leads younger firms to update more their beliefs
than older ones, which implies that the growth rates of young firms are more volatile, even
conditional on their size. The model also predicts that market-specific uncertainty limits
the extent of belief updating and the impact of age on the updating process. The main
contribution of this paper is to test these core predictions, which are specific to the passive
learning mechanism.4
To do so, we derive from the theory a methodology which allows to separately identify
the firms’ beliefs and the demand shocks (the signals) they face in each period, in each of the
markets they serve. First, we purge market-specific conditions and firm-specific supply side
dynamics (e.g. productivity) from quantities and prices. This is made possible by a unique
feature of international trade data, in which we can observe the values and quantities sold
of a given product by a given firm in different markets. This is key as it enables to cleanly
separate productivity from demand variations. In addition, observing different firms selling
the same product in the same destination allows to control for aggregate market-specific
conditions. Second, we use the fact that, in the model, quantity decisions only depend
on the firms’ beliefs while prices also depend on the realized demand shocks. This allows
to separate out the firms’ beliefs from the demand signals. Hence, while requiring few,
standard assumptions, our methodology allows to directly test predictions that relate the
evolution of firms’ beliefs to firm age and demand signals.
We find strong support for the core predictions of the model. Belief updating following
demand shocks is stronger for younger firms, with age being defined at the firm-product-
destination (i.e. firm-market) level. Further, using a theory-based measure of market-
specific uncertainty, we find that the learning process is significantly weakened and less
dependent on age in more uncertain environments. We provide several robustness exercises
to show that these results are not driven by our main modeling assumptions. Our findings
survive after accounting for potential endogenous selection bias, and are extremely stable
across alternative samples, specifications and changes in variables’ measurement. We also
discuss the implications of relaxing several important assumptions of the model related
to the timing of price and quantity adjustment, market structure and firms’ productivity.
We show that even after relaxing these assumptions, our results can still be interpreted as
evidence of belief updating. Some of these extensions however require that we control for
firm-market size in our estimations, which leaves our results unchanged.
3In Jovanovic (1982), firms actually learn about their cost parameter. While the learning mechanism
is the same, we apply it to demand, as in Timoshenko (2015).
4We additionally show in the online appendix that exit behavior is also consistent with the learning
model: the exit rate decreases with firms’ beliefs and the demand shocks the firms face, and demand shocks
trigger more exit in younger cohorts.
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The literature has proposed a number of potential supply or demand side drivers of firm
dynamics. But, learning apart, they cannot explain our main result of a smaller quantity
adjustment to past demand shocks for older firms. Suppose indeed that firms have full
information about demand, except about a stochastic shock each period. If these shocks
are iid, there is no reason for the firm to adjust quantities the period after, as these shocks
do not convey any information and have no relevance beyond the current period. If instead
shocks are persistent, there is no reason for older firms to react less to a shock of a given
size. Alternative mechanisms are also difficult to reconcile with our stylized facts.
On the supply side, several papers attempt to explain the heterogeneity in firm size
with productivity variations only (through stochastic shocks or endogenous decisions).5 By
construction, they are not able to generate an age dependence of firm growth, conditional on
size. In contrast, models introducing additional sources of heterogeneity, such as financial
constraints or capital adjustments costs, are able to generate this age dependence.6 Yet,
since these sources of heterogeneity apply to the firm as a whole, they cannot deliver the
heterogeneous firm-market specific dynamics that we find in the data.
Beyond learning, some demand side mechanisms could be affecting firm growth at the
market level. Various processes giving rise to demand accumulation have been proposed.
Firms could engage in market-specific investments (e.g. Ericson and Pakes, 1995, Luttmer,
2011, Eaton et al., 2014, Fitzgerald et al., 2016), price low in their first years to build a
consumer base (Foster et al., 2016, Gourio and Rudanko, 2014, Piveteau, 2016), or face de-
mand that evolves exogenously over time (Ruhl and Willis, 2017). Among the most recent
contributions, Ruhl and Willis (2017) use a model with stochastic entry costs and gradual
increase in demand to match the average growth and exit rates of Colombian exporters.
Arkolakis (2016) shows that a combination of idiosyncratic productivity shocks and market
penetration costs is able to reproduce some important patterns of the distribution of US
and Brazilian exporters’ growth. Since these models include some mean reversion effects,
they can generate an age dependence of firm growth conditional on size; but they fall short
at predicting the decline in the variance of growth rates with age, conditional on size.7 On
the other hand, we show that our estimates of firms’ beliefs reproduce well this observed
decline in the variance of sales growth.
The last part of our paper discusses whether alternative demand based theories, possi-
bly on top of a learning effect, could be driving our findings. We show in particular that
5See for instance Hopenhayn (1992), Luttmer (2007), Impullitti et al. (2013) for models with stochastic
shocks to productivity, Klette and Kortum (2004) or Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for theories of
endogenous productivity growth.
6See for example Cooley and Quadrini (2001) or Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) for financial con-
straints, and Clementi and Palazzi (2016) for adjustments costs.
7For example, Arkolakis (2016) assumes an exogenous Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for productivity,
which generates an age dependence of firm growth at the market level, conditional on size. But this
set-up cannot explain the decline in the variance of growth within cohorts at the market level, as Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck processes have a constant variance. What would be needed is a process that implies both
smaller shocks over time and a smaller variance of these shocks. This is not a standard feature of the most
common stochastic processes.
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theories of demand accumulation would have serious difficulties matching the profiles of
prices and quantities that we find. Indeed, in our data, once purged from their productivity
component, firm-market-specific prices are (slightly) decreasing with age. Such a pattern
contradicts models of active demand accumulation through pricing decisions or models
featuring learning in which firms set prices rather than quantities. It is however consis-
tent with the passive demand learning model, in which survivors tend to have received
relatively more “good news” than exiters, leading them to adjust their prices upwards to
take advantage of this unexpectedly high demand. As firms get better informed over time,
their prices converge to their optimal pricing rule. However, once composition effects are
controlled for, prices – in the model and in the data – are constant as firms have equal
probabilities to update upwards or downwards. Similarly, quantities should increase over
time, but in the learning model this is mostly due to selection. This prediction is confirmed
empirically: when accounting for composition effects triggered by selection, we find that
quantities within firms-markets exhibit a very limited positive growth, observed only in
the first years. This matches well our second stylized fact: a substantial part of survivors
shrinks in size due to their “over-optimistic” beliefs at entry.8
Overall, these results do not preclude alternative mechanisms to be jointly at work, but
they clearly suggest that the patterns we identify in our data are unlikely to be driven by
demand accumulation processes. Demand learning appears to be an important determinant
of the micro-dynamics of firms in narrowly defined markets, which is key as more than half
of the variance of sales growth in our sample is due to firm-market factors. This supports
the view of several recent works arguing that demand learning models reproduce well some
important characteristics of the dynamics of firms and exporters.9 Compared to these
papers, we follow a different strategy as we propose a direct test of the updating process,
which lies at the core of the learning mechanism. Our empirical methodology is close
in spirit to Foster et al. (2016, 2008), in that they also separate idiosyncratic demand
shocks from firms’ productivity, but our paper differs in several ways. In particular, we do
not need to measure productivity or other firm-specific determinants of sales to identify
demand shocks.
Finally, we assume that the actual sales of a firm in a given product-destination market
are the only source of information about demand. In other words, we assume away infor-
mation spillovers. A firm’s belief in a given market might well be affected by its beliefs in
other destinations (Albornoz et al., 2012), or about other products in the same destination
(Timoshenko, 2015). These effects might be stronger for similar destinations and products
(Morales et al., 2014; Defever et al., 2015; Lawless, 2009). The behavior of other firms
serving the same market might also play a role (Fernandes and Tang, 2014). Studying the
relative importance of these various potential sources of information is an interesting and
8We also perform a test initially proposed by Pakes and Ericson (1998), in which we regress current
firm beliefs on immediate past beliefs and initial beliefs. Consistent with a passive learning model we find
that initial beliefs are useful to forecast future firms’ beliefs throughout their life.
9See for instance Albornoz et al. (2012), Timoshenko (2015), Fernandes and Tang (2014) or Eaton et al.
(2014).
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vast question in itself, that we indeed plan to study in the future, but which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our data, document
new stylized facts about firms’ post-entry dynamics, and discuss them in light of existing
theories. In section 3 we present the model and our identification strategy. Section 4
contains our main results and section 5 various robustness exercises. Section 6 discusses
whether our results could be explained by alternative demand-based mechanisms. The last
section concludes.
2 Firm dynamics on foreign markets and export growth
2.1 Data
We use detailed firm-level data by product and destination country provided by the
French Customs. The unit of observation is an export flow by a firm i of a product k to
a destination j in year t. A product is defined at the 6-digit level (HS6). The data cover
the period from 1994 to 2005, and contain information about both the value and quantity
exported by firms, which will allow us to compute firm-destination-product specific unit
values that we will use as a proxy for prices in the second part of the paper. Section A.1
of the online appendix provides more details on the source data.
Two important notes on the terminology we use throughout the paper. First, what we
call a market is a product×destination combination. Second, age is defined by market.
Our baseline definition of age is the number of years of presence since the last entry of a
firm in a product-destination. Age is reset to zero whenever the firm exits for at least a
year from a specific market. What we call age is therefore equivalent to market-specific
tenure. Section I.2 in the online appendix discusses alternative measures. Note that in
all the empirical analysis, to ensure the consistency of our measures of age, we drop firm-
product-destination triplets already present in 1994 and 1995, as these years are used to
define entry.
Finally, a cohort of new exporters in a product-destination market includes all firms
starting to export in year t but that were not exporting in year t − 1, and we are able to
track all firms belonging to a cohort over time.
Our final dataset covers the sales of 3,844 HS6 product categories to 179 destinations
by 77,076 firms over the period 1996-2005. All these firms entered at least one market over
the period.
2.2 Stylized facts
In this section we provide two novel stylized facts on the post-entry dynamics of firms
at the product-destination level. The first is that growth rates and their variance within
cohorts decline sharply with age, within firm-markets and conditional on size. The second
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is that among survivors, growth paths are highly heterogeneous, with a large number
of firms exhibiting negative growth rates. We will argue that both facts are difficult to
reconcile with most theories of firm dynamics apart from the passive learning model.
Before explaining these facts in more details, note that our data exhibits patterns that
are in line with those found by the literature. Consistent with the results of Eaton et al.
(2008) on Colombian data (see also Haltiwanger et al., 2013 and Bernard et al., 2009), we
find that new firms-markets contribute disproportionately to aggregate trade growth: new
flows account for only 12.3 percent of total export value after a year, but this share reaches
53.5 percent after a decade. Moreover, regressing firm-market sales growth on various sets
of fixed effects, we find that market-time and firm-product-time factors only account for
44 percent of the variance of sales growth, a result which echoes the findings of Eaton
et al. (2011) or Munch and Nguyen (2014). In other words, firm-market factors are key to
explain growth dynamics. The online appendix, section A, provides further discussion of
these results.
Fact #1: Firm-market growth and its variance decline with age, conditional on
size. Contrary to most existing papers that have documented facts about the aggregate
dynamics of firms or exporters, our data allows to study growth and survival in each market
served by the firms. We consider three components of firm-market post-entry dynamics:
sales growth, exit rate, and the variance of sales growth within cohort. Figure 1.a plots
the coefficients obtained by regressing these different variables on age dummies, controlling
for sector and time dummies and, more importantly, for bins of firm size. The full set of
results is shown and further discussed in the online appendix, section A.2. All three sets of
coefficients sharply decrease with age, with age being defined as firm-product-destination
specific tenure. Both the growth rates of firms-markets and the variance of these growth
rates within cohort is about 40 percent higher in the second year than after ten years.
Importantly, we still find that sales growth declines with age when we include in our
regressions firm×product×year fixed effects which control for any unobserved supply side
factors (like financial constraints) which are common to all markets within a firm (see
online appendix, Table A.3, column 2).
Fact #2: Post-entry growth dynamics are heterogeneous across survivors. Our
second stylized fact appears in Figure 1.b, where we plot the log of quantities sold by firms
entering a given market in 1996 and staying the entire period (until 2005).10 Quantities
are normalized to one in year two.11 The horizontal lines depict the first quartile, the
median and last quartile at each age. Survivors grow after entry consistently with existing
evidence (Eaton et al., 2008, 2014; Foster et al., 2016; Ruhl and Willis, 2017; Fitzgerald
10A similar pattern is obtained with different dates of entry, or using values instead of quantities. See
Figures A.1 and A.2 in section A of the online appendix.
11We do not consider the first year because of its potential incompleteness when measured over a calendar
year (Berthou and Vicard, 2015). Similarly, we plot the statistics up to 9 years and not 10 because we
want to look at flows that will still be present the year after (and 10-year-old flows can only observed in
2005, which is the last year of our sample). The online appendix section I.3 discusses this point.
6
Figure 1: Stylized facts
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Note: Figure (a) plots the coefficients obtained from of a regression of the log change of firm sales (respectively
variance of firms’ sales and exit) on age bins, firm size and year and sector dummies (see table A.3 in online appendix
section A for the full set of results). All coefficients are relative to the omitted category, age of ten years. The
variance of firms’ sales growth is measured within cohorts of firms on a product-destination market. Similar patterns
are obtained when controlling for country-and-sector fixed effects. Figure (b) plots statistics about market-specific
firm quantities with respect to age for the cohorts of firms which entered in 1996. Quantities are normalized to 1 in
age 2. The upper and lower limits of the lines represent the first and last quartiles of the variable, with the median in between.
et al., 2016), a pattern that has motivated theories of demand accumulation. But Figure
1.b makes it clear that growth paths are greatly heterogeneous and that a significant share
of firm-markets experience negative growth. More precisely, around 40 percent of the firms
shown in this figure sell actually less at the end of the period than in their second year.
As mentioned in the introduction, the set of facts shown in Figures 1.a and 1.b is difficult
to rationalize using existing theories that do not incorporate learning. Models featuring
solely supply side dynamics that are firm or firm-product specific (productivity, financial
constraints, capital adjustment costs) cannot help understanding the behavior of firms-
products across destinations. Theories introducing both supply and demand mechanisms
are better designed to explain a heterogeneity across destinations, but they typically fail
to generate the dependence of the variance of growth rate to firm age that we observe in
the data. Finally, in models of firm dynamics with demand accumulation, survivors tend
to be those that have been able to accumulate demand. This allows to fit the average
growth path of new firms/exporters observed in the data but does not necessarily provide
a framework to think about heterogeneous outcomes across firms. On the other hand,
the passive learning model naturally generates these patterns. The decline in the variance
of growth rates with cohort age is caused by the larger updating of younger firms. The
decline in growth rates is mostly driven by selection: firms that decline the most in size
exit the market, which implies that the distribution of growth rates is truncated from
7
below. Together with their larger variance, this implies larger growth rates for younger
firms, conditional on survival. It should be noted that the passive learning model is also
consistent with larger unconditional growth rates.12 Finally, the high heterogeneity in
firms’ growth paths after some years comes from the fact that initial prior beliefs may not
be accurate, leading some firms to shrink in size over time.
3 A model of firm growth with demand learning
We consider a standard model of international trade with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition and demand learning in the spirit of Jovanovic (1982). As earlier, we index
firms by i, destination markets by j, products by k and time by t.
3.1 Economic environment
Demand. Consumers in country j maximize utility derived from the consumption of
goods from K sectors. Each sector is composed of a continuum of differentiated varieties
of product k:
Uj = E
+∞∑
t=0
βt ln (Cjt)
with Cjt =
K∏
k=0
(∫
Ωkt
(eaijkt)
1
σk ckt(ω)
σk−1
σk dω
) µkσk
(σk−1)
with β the discount factor, Ωkt the set of varieties of product k available at time t, ckt is
the consumption level of each variety, and
∑
k µk = 1. Demand in market j at time t for
a variety of product k supplied by firm i is given by:
qijkt = e
aijktp−σkijkt
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
where P 1−σkjkt =
∫
Ωkt
eaijktp1−σkijkt dω (1)
where σk is the (sector-specific) elasticity of substitution, Yjt is total expenditure and Pjkt
is the ideal price index of destination j in sector k, during year t. The demand parameter
aijkt is given by aijkt = aijk +εijkt, with εijkt a white noise. aijk is an idiosyncratic constant
parameter and is unknown to the firm.
Production. Each period, firms make quantity decisions for their product(s), before
observing demand in each market served, i.e. before observing aijkt. The unit cost function
is linear in the marginal cost and there is a per-period fixed cost Fijk to be paid for each
product-destination pair. Labor L is the only factor of production. Current input prices
are taken as given (firms are small) and there is no wedge between the buying and selling
price of the input (i.e. perfect reversibility in the hiring decision). Hence, the quantity
decision is a static decision.
12This is however generated by functional form assumptions. See the online appendix G for details.
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We do not make any assumption on the evolution of firm productivity. Productivity
may also be subject to learning, in which case the firm would base its quantity decision
on its beliefs about its costs. As we will not back out learning from firms’ productivity,
we do not add expectation terms here to save on notations. We only need to assume that
unit costs at the firm-product level are not destination specific – we come back to this
assumption in section 3.3. Per period profits in market j from product k write:
piijkt = qijktpijkt − wit
ϕikt
qijkt − Fijk (2)
where wit is the wage rate in the origin country, ϕikt is the product-time specific produc-
tivity of firm i.
Learning. Firm i is uncertain about the parameter aijk. Before observing any signal,
its prior beliefs about aijk are normally distributed with mean θijk0 and variance σ
2
jk0.
Different firms may well have different initial beliefs prior to entry (i.e. different θijk0).
θijk0 is drawn from a normal distribution with mean aijk and variance σ
2
jk0: prior beliefs
may not be accurate, but are unbiased on average.13 The firm observes t independent
signals about aijk: aijkt = aijk + εijkt, where each εijkt is normal with (known) mean 0 and
variance σ2ε . According to Bayes’ rule, the firm’s posterior beliefs about aijk after t signals
are normally distributed with mean θ˜ijkt and variance σ˜
2
ijkt, where:
θ˜ijkt = θijk0
1
σ2jk0
1
σ2jk0
+ t
σ2
+ aijkt
t
σ2
1
σ2jk0
+ t
σ2
(3)
σ˜2ijkt =
1
1
σ2jk0
+ t
σ2
(4)
and aijkt is the average signal value, aijkt =
(
1
t
∑
t aijkt
)
. Note that contrary to θ˜ijkt, the
posterior variance σ˜2ijkt does not depend on the realizations of the signals and decreases
only with the number of signals (i.e. learning reduces uncertainty). Hence, the posterior
variance is always smaller than the prior variance, σ˜2ijkt < σ˜
2
ijkt−1.
In the following, it will be useful to formulate the Bayesian updating recursively. De-
noting ∆θ˜ijkt = θ˜ijkt − θ˜ijkt−1, we have:
∆θ˜ijkt = gt
(
aijkt − θ˜ijkt−1
)
with gt =
1
σ2
σ2jk0
+ t
. (5)
Intuitively, observing a higher-than-expected signal, aijkt > θ˜ijkt−1 leads the agent to
revise the expectation upward, θ˜ijkt > θ˜ijkt−1, and vice versa. This revision is large when
gt is large, which happens when t is small, i.e. when the firm is “young” in market jk.
13We could further assume, leaving our results fully unchanged, that the variance of the prior beliefs is
firm specific, i.e. σ2ijk0. We would need to assume in that case that this firm specific variance is independent
from firm characteristics.
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3.2 Firm size and belief updating
Firms maximize expected profits, subject to demand. Labelling Gt−1(aijkt) the prior
distribution of aijkt at the beginning of period t (i.e. the posterior distribution after having
observed t− 1 signals), firm i maximizes:
max
q
∫
piijktdGt−1(aijkt) s.t. pijkt =
(
µkYjte
aijkt
qijktP
1−σk
jkt
) 1
σk
. (6)
Here, we assume for simplicity that aggregate market conditions at time t, i.e. µkYjt/P
1−σk
jkt ,
are observed by firms before making their quantity decision. This leads to the following
optimal quantities and prices (see appendix):
q∗ijkt =
(
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕikt
)−σk ( µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
)(
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
])σk
(7)
p∗ijkt =
(
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕikt
) eaijktσk
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
 (8)
with Et−1[e
aijkt
σk ] =
∫
e
aijkt
σk dGt−1(aijkt). As firm imakes a quantity decision before observing
demand for its product, q∗ijkt depends on expected demand, not on demand realization,
contrary to p∗ijkt.
The literature has typically computed correlations between firm age and firm growth
rates, and attributed negative ones as potential evidence for a learning mechanism. Indeed
the fact that younger firms adjust more their beliefs leads growth rate to decrease with
age in absolute value. But of course, as is clear from equations (7) and (8), firm size
and therefore firm growth (would it be measured in terms of employment or sales) also
depend on the evolution of market-specific conditions and firm productivity, which could
be correlated with firm age. Directly testing for the presence of demand learning thus
requires either making assumptions about the dynamics of aggregate market conditions
and firm productivity or finding a way to account for them. Our methodology follows the
second route.
Let us now decompose optimal quantities and prices into three components. They first
depend on unit costs, which are a function of wages in country i and firm-product specific
productivity ϕikt. This first component is ikt-specific, i.e. is independent of the destination
served; we label it Cikt. Second, they depend on aggregate market conditions, which are
common to all firms selling product k to destination j. We label this component Cjkt.
Finally, they depend on the firm i beliefs about expected demand in j for its product k
and on the demand shock at time t. This last composite term – labelled Zijkt – is the only
one to be impacted by firm learning about its demand in a specific destination market: it
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is ijkt-specific. We can now rewrite the above expressions for quantities and prices as:
q∗ijkt = C
q
iktC
q
jktZ
q
ijkt (9)
p∗ijkt = C
p
iktZ
p
ijkt. (10)
The impact of demand learning is fully included in the Zqijkt and Z
p
ijkt terms. These
terms can be understood as the quantity and price of firm i for product k on market j
at time t, purged from firm unit costs and aggregate market conditions, and may be very
different from the actual firm size and firm price. From a methodological point of view,
any prediction about firm demand learning should be based on these Zijkt terms rather
than the actual q∗ijkt and p
∗
ijkt. This also means that we will not look at the dynamics of
firm size (at least per se), but directly at the dynamics of the firms’ beliefs about demand.
Their growth rate can be expressed as:14
∆ lnEt
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]
=
gt
σk
(
aijkt − θ˜ijkt−1
)
− gt
σk
σ˜2ijkt−1
2σk
. (11)
At the beginning of period t, firms make quantity decisions based on their beliefs about
local demand for their product (θ˜ijkt−1). Then, demand is realized (aijkt) and firms update
their beliefs. A higher than expected demand leads the firm to update upwards its belief.
The opposite is true for a lower than expected demand. Importantly, as is clear from
equation (11), this upward or downward updating is larger for younger firms. It follows
our main prediction:
Prediction # 1 (updating and age): A given difference between realized and expected de-
mand leads to a larger updating of the belief, the younger the firm is.
It is also interesting to note that larger uncertainty (i.e. a higher σ2 ) reduces the extent
of belief updating and the effect of age on belief updating. This is because a signal is less
informative when uncertainty is higher. Put differently, the information contained in the
realized price will be noisier when σ2ε is large, in which case firms will adjust less their
beliefs in the next period. This is our second prediction:
Prediction # 2 (updating and uncertainty): A higher level of market uncertainty reduces
the extent of beliefs updating, and the effect of age on belief updating.
In the next section, we derive our methodology to isolate the Zqijkt and Z
p
ijkt terms and
distinguish the beliefs from the demand shock component.
3.3 Identification and measurement
Identifying beliefs. In order to isolate Zqijkt and Z
p
ijkt, we need to purge supply side and
market specific factors from actual quantities and prices. This is achieved by estimating
14Detailed derivations and proofs of all our propositions are relegated to the appendix.
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the following quantity and price equations in logs:15
ln qijkt = FEikt + FEjkt + ε
q
ijkt (12)
ln pijkt = FEikt + ε
p
ijkt (13)
where k is a 6-digit product and t is a year. FEikt and FEjkt represent respectively firm-
product-year and destination-product-year fixed effects. Note that we do not have direct
price data, so we rely on unit values, defined as Sijkt/qijkt, where Sijkt denote firms sales,
to proxy them. In our baseline estimations, we stick to the model and estimate the price
equation without the jkt fixed effects, as implied by the CES assumption. In section 5.1
we discuss the implications of relaxing the CES assumption, one of them being that we
need to control for market-specific conditions in the price equation.
The estimates of εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt are estimates of the Zijkt terms. Using (7) and (8), we
get:
εqijkt = lnZ
q
ijkt = σk lnEt−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
(14)
εpijkt = lnZ
p
ijkt =
1
σk
aijkt − lnEt−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
. (15)
This identification strategy is possible to implement because we are able to observe the
sales of the same product by the same firm in different destination markets, which allows
purging market-specific firm dynamics from the evolution of firm productivity through the
inclusion of FEikt.
16 As we account for all time-varying, market- and firm-product-specific
determinants of quantities and prices, our approach could accommodate any underlying
dynamic process for the ikt and jkt terms. This includes processes driving the evolution of
firm productivity, but also any other time-varying, firm-specific factors that might affect
firm dynamics, such as financial constraints, as well as variations in market-specific trade
costs.
Consistently estimating the residuals of (12) and (13) however requires some identifica-
tion assumptions. In particular, εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt need to be orthogonal to firm characteristics
{wit, ϕikt}, and εqijkt must also be orthogonal to market conditions {Yjt, Pjkt}. This implies
that beliefs do not vary systematically with productivity, or, in other words, that initial
beliefs must be unbiased also along the firm productivity dimension. This rules out the pos-
sibility that firms engage in overall productivity-enhancing investments because they have
higher beliefs in a given market. Note however that our identification strategy does not
preclude firms to modify a market-specific productivity component in response to changes
15We use the Stata routine reghdfe developed by Sergio Correia, based on Guimaraes and Portugal
(2010).
16The reason why we do not model learning about productivity appears more clearly in equations (14)
and (15). Identifying demand variations is possible because we are able to control for productivity through
the inclusion of ikt fixed effects. On the other hand, we cannot distinguish productivity variations from
global demand shocks faced by firms in all the markets, as these would be mixed with unit costs in the
FEikt.
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in their information set. In section 5.1, we thus allow productivity to differ across desti-
nations for a given firm-product. The condition on εpijkt also implies that demand signals
aijkt must be orthogonal to firms’ overall costs {wit, ϕikt}. Put differently, we make the
standard assumption that firms with high productivity do not enjoy higher market specific
demand beyond the effect of their productivity on demand through lower prices.
These orthogonality restrictions also reflect our assumption that beliefs are market-
specific, i.e. that firms do not adjust their beliefs to information arriving from other
markets. As mentioned in the introduction, in theory there could be spillovers taking
many different forms: beliefs could depend on the experience accumulated by the firm
in selling the same product to other destinations, including the domestic market. They
could also vary with the information obtained when selling other products in the same
market. Studying such informational spillovers is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, we
are confident that the information we capture is indeed market-specific. The reason is that
our identification strategy de facto constrains the set of possible determinants of beliefs.
For instance, if these are partly determined by past domestic market experience for the
same product, or by past experience in other markets for the same product, then the ikt
fixed effects will account for them. In other words, εqijkt captures the firms’ beliefs net of
the effect of experience in other markets at time t.17
Finally, a note on our interpretation of the residuals (14) and (15). Following the model,
we consider that these residuals reflect the demand-side components of prices and quan-
tities. Our identification assumption is that, within a given firm, costs can differ across
products but not across products and destinations. Note however that we allow variations
in costs across markets for a given product. These include in particular trade costs and
potential differences in demand for quality and are captured by FEjkt. In section 5.1 we
allow productivity to be market-specific and show that we can still consistently estimate
the demand shocks. We do not, however, allow firms to learn about market-specific costs.
As discussed in section 6, the evidence we find on the profiles of εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt is more
consistent with firms learning about demand than about costs, but we cannot exclude
that firms are learning about demand shifters such as market-specific trade costs. Such a
learning process would be isomorphic to learning about demand. We favor the traditional
demand learning formulation, yet what we call demand learning could be encompassing
learning about demand-shifters.
Identifying demand shocks. Testing prediction 1 requires getting estimates of the
demand signals aijkt. Because the firm takes its quantity decision before observing the
17Our methodology does not, on the other hand, takes into account the possibility that beliefs depend
on the information gathered by the firm while selling other products in the same destination. This would
require including ijt fixed effects in equations (12) and (13). We have tried to include these and our
estimates were largely unaffected (see section I.5 in the online appendix). This lends support to our
assumption that information is indeed mostly product-market specific: if shocks and beliefs were correlated
across products within destinations, the firms’ response to a demand shock would partly reflect its belief
updating behavior on other products, and including ijt fixed effect should dampen the extent of estimated
belief updating.
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demand realization, lnZqijkt depends on the firms’ beliefs about demand only, while lnZ
p
ijkt
is adjusted for the demand shock (an assumption that we discuss in section 5.1). Thus,
the residual εqijkt provides a direct estimate of the firms’ beliefs. We only need to correct
for σk. In order to back out the demand shock and get an estimate of σk, we regress ε
p
ijkt
on εqijkt. Using (15) and (14), we get:(
1
σk
aijkt − lnEt−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
])
= β
(
σk lnEt−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
])
+ λijk + vijkt. (16)
We need to include firm-product-destination fixed effects λijk to account for the fact
that aijkt = aijk + εijkt. Omitting these fixed effects would generate inconsistent estimates
of β as both vijkt and the firm beliefs Et−1
[
exp(
aijkt
σk
)
]
would depend on aijk, which would
violate the zero conditional mean assumption.18 Including λijk allows to take out aijk from
the error term vijkt and recover consistent estimates of β. We estimate (17) by 6-digit
product to allow σk to differ across products and obtain:
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β̂ = − 1
σk
; λ̂ijk + v̂ijkt ≡ âijkt = 1
σk
aijkt ; v̂ijkt =
1
σk
εijkt. (17)
Note that the level of uncertainty can be directly inferred from our estimates of demand
signals. We define market-specific uncertainty as the standard deviation of aijkt, computed
by product-and-destination, over our data period.
The last variable we need to test our predictions is market-specific firm age, which has
been defined in section 2. Age is either constructed as a single discrete variable or as a set
of dummies, to allow the learning processes to be non-linear.
Testing prediction #1. We can now derive our testable equation. Equation (11) cannot
be tested directly as we do not observe θ˜ijkt−1 but only ε
q
ijkt. We make use of (11), (5) and
(14), to get the following specification (see the appendix):
∆εqijkt+1 =gt
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
+gt
σ2ε
2σk
. (18)
This equation is equivalent to (11), except that it can be tested: our estimates of εqijkt
comes from (12), and aijkt is computed from equation (17) as the product of âijkt times σk.
gt is an inverse function of market-specific age (equation (5)). We estimate:
∆εqijkt+1 =
G∑
g=2
αg(aijkt − εqijkt)× AGEgijkt +
G∑
g=1
βgAGE
g
ijkt + uijkt (19)
18We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.
19Whenever our estimates of β are statistically insignificant or imply values of σk which are lower than
1, we replace v̂ by a missing value and do not consider the observation in the estimations. Note that our
results are insensitive to such cleaning of the data. σk is lower than 1 for only 0.01% of observations, and
insignificant β coefficients (at the 5% level) are obtained for 1.6% of observations. See the upper panel of
Table A.4 in the online appendix. We also perform a robustness exercise where equation (17) is estimated
at the 4-digit instead of 6-digit level to end up with more observations by product and more efficient
estimations.
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where AGEgijkt are dummies taking the value 1 for each age category g = 2, ...10 repre-
senting the number of years of presence in the export market (e.g. g = 2 in the second
year of presence). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm
(or, alternatively, bootstrapped). We expect αg to be positive on average, and βg to be
decreasing with age. Our main prediction is that αg decreases with age g. Note that
equation (18) predicts that αg = gt =
1
σ2ε/σ
2
jk0+t
with gt measuring the speed of learning.
Hence, the evolution of the αg coefficients with firm age allow to assess how firms learn
about their demand parameter.
Our test of the passive learning mechanism therefore builds on the evidence that firms
adjust their quantities to past demand shocks and that such a reaction gets smaller as
firms grow older in a market. This decline of the quantity reaction to past demand shocks
is a distinctive feature of the learning process. If firms had full information about demand,
stochastic iid shocks should not generate any quantity reaction beyond the current period
as these shocks would not provide any information. In that case, the coefficients αg should
be equal to zero. If instead shocks were persistent, firms would always adjust their next
period quantities in the same way: the αg coefficients would be positive but constant over
time.
4 Main results
In this section, we start by providing some descriptive statistics about our final sample,
before discussing the results obtained when testing prediction 1. We then study how market
uncertainty affect the characteristics of the learning process.
4.1 Sample statistics
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics about our final sample. Firms are typically
young in the markets they serve: the average age is comprised between 3.5 and 3.8 years
depending on the definition (note that since we focus on ∆εqijkt in the following, firms that
exit during the first year are dropped and 2 is the minimum value that our age variable
can take). This is evidence of the low survival rates observed during the first years a firm
serves a particular market (Figure 1.a). Over the period, the firm-market specific beliefs
have been characterized by a positive average growth, while ∆εpijkt is slightly negative on
average.
Our methodology generates reasonable estimates of σk: we get a median value of 5.1
and an average of 6.2 in our final sample. These numbers are comparable to the ones
found by the literature, using very different methodologies and data.20 Our estimates of
σk also follow expected patterns: considering Rauch (1999)’s classification, the median
(resp. mean) across products is 5.2 (resp. 6.1) for differentiated goods, 7.3 (resp. 8.6) for
referenced priced goods and 8.9 (resp. 10.1) for goods classified as homogenous. These
20See Imbs and Mejean (2015) for a detailed literature review.
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Table 1: Sample statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3
ln qijkt 4382989 6.237 2.795 4.277 6.004 8.001
ln pijkt 4382989 3.115 1.969 1.808 3.058 4.358
∆εqijkt 1854141 0.030 1.200 -0.631 0.026 0.687
∆εpijkt 1854141 -0.002 0.672 -0.224 -0.000 0.221
aijkt − εqijk.t−1 1854141 -0.052 3.425 -1.340 -0.041 1.180
aijkt 1854141 -0.003 0.562 -0.261 0.001 0.256
σk 1854141 6.205 4.783 3.566 5.089 6.593
sd(aijkt) 1848126 2.603 1.493 1.895 2.267 2.802
Age1ijkt 1854141 3.505 1.800 2 3 4
Age2ijkt 1854141 3.671 1.851 2 3 5
Age3ijkt 1854141 3.759 1.851 2 3 5
Source: Authors’ computations from French Customs data. ln qijkt and ln pijkt are the logs of quantities and prices sold by a
firm i in a market jk a given year t. εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt are respectively the belief of the firm about future demand from equation
(14) and the residuals of the price equation from equation (15). Age1ijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the
firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Age2ijkt: reset after 2 years of exit; Age
3
ijkt: years of exporting since
first entry (never reset to zero). aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17). σk: elasticity of substitution
from equation (17). sd(aijkt) is the standard deviation of aijkt, computed by market (product-destination).
means and medians of σk are statistically different across the three groups.
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4.2 Baseline results
The results obtained when estimating equation (19) are provided in Table 2. The first
column considers separately the effect of demand shocks and age on changes in firms’
beliefs. Columns (2) to (7) study how age affects the reaction of beliefs to demand shocks.
Columns (3), (5) and (7) are equivalent to columns (2), (4) and (6) with standard errors
being bootstrapped rather than clustered by firm, to account for the fact that the right
hand side variables have been estimated.
As predicted, firms update their beliefs positively when they face a higher than expected
demand, and the growth in beliefs declines with age on average (column (1)). More impor-
tantly, we find support for our key prediction: belief updating following a demand shock
is significantly stronger when firms are young (columns (2)-(7)). Including age linearly
(column (2) and (3)) or through bins (columns (4) to (7)) leads to the same conclusion.
Bootstrapping the standard errors also leaves the results unaffected.
After a decade of presence in the market, the magnitude of belief updating following
a given demand shock is 30 percent smaller than after entry. In columns (6) and (7), we
find that, when compared to the benchmark category – age of ten years –, the coefficients
of the first four years (first six years with bootstrapped standard errors) are significantly
21See section B of the online appendix for details. Note that these numbers are slightly higher than the
means and medians displayed in Table 1 because they are computed across products, while the statistics
in Table 1 are based on our final sample, i.e. also reflect the number of French firms selling each product.
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Table 2: Prediction 1: demand shocks and beliefs updating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
aijkt − εqijkt 0.064a 0.074a 0.074a 0.047a 0.047a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.069a 0.069a 0.022a 0.022a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.064a 0.064a 0.017b 0.017a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.060a 0.060a 0.013c 0.013b
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.057a 0.057a 0.010 0.010b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.058a 0.058a 0.011 0.011b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.054a 0.054a 0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.052a 0.052a 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.052a 0.052a 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.047a 0.047a
(0.007) (0.005)
Ageijkt -0.033
a -0.033a -0.033a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 1854141 1854141 1854141 1854141 1854141 1854141 1854141
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in columns (3), (5) and (7)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a
significant at 1%. Age dummies included alone in columns (4) to (7) but coefficients not reported. Columns (6) and (7) are the same as column
(4) and (5) except that coefficients are estimated relative to the baseline omitted category, age of ten years. aijkt is our estimate of the demand
shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last
entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit).
higher. The shape of the learning process is consistent with the theory: age has a strong
effect in early years, and matters less for more experienced firms (section C in the online
appendix provides a graphical depiction of the result and a discussion of our functional
form assumption). Note that most of our estimated coefficients are statistically different
from each other up to year seven, which supports the existence of a learning process over
this time horizon. After seven years, our results no longer provide clear evidence of learning
(note however that the coefficient of the last category is less precisely estimated due to the
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small number of observations). However, even the most experienced firms in our sample still
significantly adjust their quantities following demand shocks. Assuming that part of the
demand signals received is persistent would explain this finding: in that case, experienced
firms would continue to adjust their quantities to demand shocks even if they have fully
discovered their idiosyncratic demand.
4.3 Learning and market uncertainty
Our second prediction is that a higher level of uncertainty in the market (a higher σ2ε
in the model) should slowdown the updating process. The underlying intuition is that a
demand signal is less informative when uncertainty is higher. It follows that the speed at
which firms update their beliefs should decrease with age, but less so when uncertainty is
larger (see proof of prediction 1 in the appendix).
Table 3: Prediction 1: the role of uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Sample High Low
Uncertainty
aijkt − εqijkt 0.102a 0.113a 0.054a 0.163a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.006a -0.002a -0.007a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
× Uncertainty -0.005a -0.006a
(0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt× Uncertainty 0.001a
(0.000)
Ageijkt -0.033
a -0.027a -0.037a -0.028a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty -0.004b 0.004c
(0.001) (0.002)
Ageijkt× Uncertainty -0.002a
(0.000)
Observations 1848126 1848126 928963 919146
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate of
the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years
since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Uncertainty is the standard deviation of aijkt, computed by
market jk. High and low uncertainty mean above and below sample median.
We use our theory-based measure of market uncertainty (the standard deviation of
aijkt, computed by product and destination over the entire period). We then add to speci-
fication (19) an interaction term between our uncertainty measure and (aijkt − εqijkt), and
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a triple interaction between age, (aijkt − εqijkt) and uncertainty (as well as an interaction
term between age and uncertainty). Table 3 contains the results. Column (1) shows that,
as predicted, the extent of belief updating following a demand shock is smaller in markets
characterized by a higher level of uncertainty. On the other hand, the coefficient on the in-
teraction term between age and the demand shocks is virtually unaffected. Quantitatively,
the role of uncertainty is non negligible. A standard deviation increase from the mean of
the level of uncertainty decreases the response of beliefs to demand shocks from 0.090 to
0.082 in column (1).
Moreover, when uncertainty is large, gaining experience has a lower effect on belief
updating, as shown by the coefficient of the triple interaction term in column (2). Another
way to represent these results is to separate the sample into high and low uncertainty
markets, defined according to the sample median of our uncertainty measure. We run our
baseline specification (column (4) of Table 2) separately on each of the two sub-samples.
The results are displayed in column (3) and (4) of Table 3. We clearly see that the average
extent of belief updating is much larger in markets with low uncertainty levels, and that
updating decreases more with age in the least uncertain markets. In the online appendix,
section D we use bins of age categories and a more extreme sample split (first and last
quartile of uncertainty). In these specifications, we find that the updating coefficient
decreases from 0.171 in the second year to 0.128 after ten years in the least uncertain
markets, while in the most uncertain markets the relationship is flatter and updating is
almost nonexistent as the coefficients decrease from 0.035 to 0.021.
5 Robustness
In this section we first assess the implications of several key assumptions of our model
for our identification strategy and the interpretation of our results. We then discuss how
our results might be affected by endogenous exit, before considering a series of additional
sensitivity tests.
5.1 Modelling assumptions
Our model makes three important assumptions. First, firms set their quantities before
observing the demand realization, as in Jovanovic (1982). Second, firms face CES demand
and monopolistic competition (hence markups are constant). Third, firm productivity is
not market-specific. In this subsection we assess the sensitivity of our results to these
hypotheses (we discuss the validity of our demand-side modelling of learning in section
6). In particular, we show how they affect (i) the identification of beliefs and demand
signals and (ii) our test of prediction 1. Relaxing these assumptions implies in general
that the residuals εqijkt can no longer be interpreted as reflecting beliefs only. However –
and provided that we control for market-specific firm size in some cases –, these extensions
do not alter the qualitative interpretation of our results, in the sense that our baseline
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estimates of Table 2 can still be viewed as evidence of belief updating. For each extension,
we summarize here the main intuitions and refer the reader to the online appendix E for
details.
5.1.1 Fixed quantities
We have assumed so far that quantities are set before firms observe their idiosyncratic
demand in each market, while prices adjust to the demand shocks. We relax this assump-
tion in two directions: we start by considering the possibility that prices are set first,
with or without a constant price elasticity. Second, we assume that firms can adjust their
quantity decision after observing part of the demand shock.
If we completely reverse our assumption and suppose that prices are set ex-ante while
quantities fully adjust to demand shocks, due to CES demand, prices will only depend on
supply side characteristics. They take the form of a constant mark-up over marginal costs
and do not vary with the quantity produced, the firm’s beliefs or the demand shock. Quan-
tities on the other hand fully adjust and depend solely on the demand shocks. Regressing
εpijkt on ε
q
ijkt should therefore generate insignificant β̂ coefficients, and ε
q
ijkt should not vary
with age. Both these predictions are clearly at odds with our findings.
Now, assume that prices are set ex-ante but the market structure is oligopolistic, which
implies variable markups. In this case, prices reflect the firm’s beliefs, as markups depend
on its expected market share. Quantities reflect both these beliefs and the demand shocks.
We can still estimate demand signals, but our identification strategy should be reversed:
εqijkt should be regressed on ε
p
ijkt, and the updating process should be observed on ∆ε
p
ijkt.
The main prediction of such a model is that a positive demand shock should lead firms to
update upwards their beliefs, which would increase their markup and their prices. In the
online appendix (section E.2), we follow this alternative methodology and find that prices
slightly decrease with demand shocks, which is inconsistent with this alternative model of
Bertrand competition with a non-constant price elasticity.
Finally, we consider an intermediate case where firms can revise their quantity decision
after observing part of the demand shock. In this case, our theoretical predictions still
hold, but the identification of the demand shock is affected: εqijkt now also captures part
of the demand shock and becomes a noisy measure of the firm’s belief. This may affect
our estimates of the demand shocks, although the direction of this bias is unclear. Yet,
unless this bias is correlated with age, our main results that young firms update more their
beliefs should not be affected. One way to gauge the importance of this possible bias is to
focus on sectors or destinations for which quantities are more likely to be rigid – i.e. those
for which the demand shocks are more likely to be correctly estimated – and to compare
the results with our baseline estimates of Table 2. We expect less quantity adjustment
for complex goods (in which many different relationship-specific inputs are used in the
production process) and in destinations characterized by longer time-to-ship. In section
E.3 of the online appendix, we restrict our sample to sectors or destinations which are
above the sample median in terms of time-to-ship or input complexity. The estimated
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magnitude of belief updating and the coefficient on the interaction terms between demand
shocks and age are quantitatively similar to our baseline estimates.22 Altogether, these
results suggest that our assumption of fixed quantities is not unrealistic and does not lead
our identification strategy to artificially generate our results.
5.1.2 Other extensions and control for size
Our next two extensions allow respectively for variable mark-ups and for productivity
to be market-specific. We reach similar conclusions in both cases. εqijkt can no longer be
interpreted as beliefs about demand only – it is also affected by mark-ups or productivity.
∆εqijkt+1 therefore reflects changes in beliefs as well as variations in mark-ups or produc-
tivity. The key point, however, is that we are still able to interpret the reaction of firms
to demand shocks as evidence of belief updating, provided that we control for size. The
complete derivations are provided in sections E.4 and E.5 of the online appendix.
Variable mark-ups. The first implication of variable mark-ups for our empirical strategy
is that prices could now depend on local market conditions, i.e. the price equation (13)
should include a set of jkt fixed-effects. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 at the end of this
section shows that this modification leaves our results largely unchanged.
Second and more importantly, the quantities residuals εqijkt should now capture the
firms’ beliefs, but also their expected markups. Hence, changes in expected mark-ups
should affect ∆εqijkt+1. To take into account this possibility, we extend the model to an
oligopolistic market structure. Formally, we simply assume that the number of competitors
in each sector K, Ωkt, is small enough so that each competitor takes into account the
impact of his own decisions on the sectoral price index. As shown in the online appendix,
our methodology still produce unbiased estimates of the demand shock. Our main equation
however becomes:
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
+gt
σ2ε
2σk
−σkgt ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
−σk∆ ln
(
Et [ε(sijkt+1)]
Et [ε(sijkt+1)]− 1
)
where Et−1 [ε(sijkt)] is the expected elasticity of demand faced by firm i in market jk at
the beginning of period t, which itself depends on the expected market share Et−1 [sijkt].
With variable mark-ups, our main equation includes two new terms.
The first term is the level of the expected mark-ups. It comes from the fact that the
expected mark-up also affects our measure of beliefs, εqijkt, and in turn
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
. We
thus need to control for firm size/market share to avoid a standard omitted variable bias.
The second term captures the change in expected mark-ups, and it depends on the
updating process through the change in the expected market share. Our measure of belief
updating is now underestimated: when firms update positively, they tend to increase their
22The coefficient on the interaction term between demand shocks and age is slightly lower than our
baseline in the case of complex goods (col. (5) of Table A.7). In column (6), however, we see that this
result is only driven by the effect of the last age category, 10 years of experience, which is itself quite
imprecisely estimated.
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quantities but also their prices, which dampens their overall quantity reaction. It follows
that in the case of variable mark-ups, εqijkt becomes an increasing function of firm’s beliefs
23
and we only capture the overall reaction of purged quantities to belief updating. Put
differently, our results still provide evidence for the updating process, but in a qualitative
sense.
Importantly, two firms of different sizes may not have the same mark-up reaction to
a given belief update. This is another reason to control for market share: to be able to
compare the extent of updating of firms of different age, but with the same market share.
Product-destination productivity. In the model, we have assumed that productiv-
ity was firm-product-specific. Here we relax this assumption and consider the case of
product-destination-specific productivity. This again introduces a new source of dynamics
in εqijkt. We assume that the unit cost of producing good k for market j at time t is
wit
ϕikt
1
ϕijkt
.
This could reflect differences in productivity for the same good across markets, but also
differences in product quality. Again, our methodology still produces unbiased estimates
of the shock, as shown in the online appendix. But the dynamics of quantities now also
reflects the evolution of ϕijkt. We get:
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
+ gt
σ2ε
2σk
+ σkgt ln (ϕijkt) + σk∆ ln (ϕijkt+1) .
As for the case of variable mark-ups, because εqijkt contains a new element, our equa-
tion now has two additional terms: one in level because ln (ϕijkt) alters our measure of
beliefs, and one in difference ∆ ln (ϕijkt+1), because ∆ε
q
ijkt+1 also reflects the dynamics of
productivity. Again, the first term implies that we need to control for firm size, to avoid
a standard omitted variable bias. Second, the dynamics of ln (ϕijkt) also affects ∆ε
q
ijkt+1.
If this dynamics is uncorrelated with the updating process, the interpretation of our re-
sults should be unaffected. If however ∆ ln (ϕijkt+1) is positively affected by the updating
process – if a positive updating leads firms to invest to improve ϕijkt – then our measure
of updating becomes a measure of the overall impact of the updating process on ∆εqijkt+1:
it does not only capture the updating process itself but also how the quantity response is
magnified by a change in productivity.24 Again, εqijkt would become an increasing function
of firm’s beliefs, and our evidence of the updating process would become qualitative as we
would not identify firms’ beliefs per se. This productivity response could be size depen-
dent, which again requires to control for firm size. The decline of the overall response of
∆εqijkt+1 to demand shocks over time, conditional on size, however still provides evidence
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Table 4: Prediction 1: controlling for size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Robustness Controlling for FEjkt Controlling for FEjkt
in prices in prices and size
Size Linear Bins
aijkt − εqijkt 0.103a 0.103a 0.102a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.096a 0.096a 0.096a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
...
× Ageijkt = 10 0.074a 0.074a 0.075a
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ageijkt -0.034
a -0.040a 0.019a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sizeijkt -1.053
a -1.015a
(0.016) (0.017)
× Ageijkt 0.109a 0.101a
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 1870377 1870377 1870377 1870377 1501840 1501840
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%. a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate of
the demand shock from equation (17). In this table, jkt fixed effects are included in the estimation of the price residuals ε
p
ijkt
used to identify
demand shocks. ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (17). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of
the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Sizeijkt is proxied by the value sold by firm i on market jk during year t divided
by the total value exported by French firms in market jk during year t. Columns (5) and (6) include size bins corresponding to the ten deciles
of size variable, computed by market-year. Age dummies included alone in columns (2), (4) and (6) but coefficients not reported. See Table A.8
in the online appendix for the full set of coefficients on the interaction terms.
for an updating process.
Controlling for size. The two extensions of the models discussed above suggest that
firm-market size should be included in our regressions, together with its interaction with
firm-market age. We do so in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) are similar to our baseline
regressions (Table 2, columns (2) and (4)), except that jkt fixed effects are introduced in
the estimation of the price residuals εpijkt, as predicted by models with variable markups.
The average level of belief updating is slightly larger than in our baseline estimates, but
23Formally, we derive in the online appendix two alternatives sufficient conditions ensuring that the
overall quantity response to a positive updating is still positive: either σk ≥ 2 or sijkt ≤ 1/2.
24Note that this possibility does not violate the orthogonality conditions that we need to identify demand
shocks. As discussed in section 3.3, we need the beliefs a firm in market jk at time t to be orthogonal to
overall firm-product characteristics; yet, beliefs can be correlated with the characteristics of a firm-product
in that particular market j.
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the effect of age is similar. In columns (3) to (6) we additionally control for firm size, as
measured by the value sold by firm i on market jk during year t− 1 divided by the total
value exported by French firms in market jk during year t − 1. Size is introduced either
linearly in columns (3) and (4) or through bins computed using market-specific deciles in
columns (5) and (6). Our coefficients of interest are extremely stable across specifications.25
In the online appendix E.6, we consider a number of alternative measures of firm size and
include interaction terms between size and aijkt− εqijkt to account for the fact that age and
size are correlated. In all instances the results are similar to our benchmark estimates.
5.2 Survival and selection bias
Our main prediction is tested on the sample of firms which survive in period t. En-
dogenous sample selection could be a concern in equation (19). The error term uijkt might
be correlated in particular with demand shocks: the observed sample includes firms with
relatively positive demand shocks (as those with negative shocks are more likely to exit),
and firms which do not update downward their beliefs too much following a negative signal
(otherwise they would exit). In other words, endogenous exit might create a correlation
between the error term of (19) and demand shocks.
The predictions of the learning model for survival are discussed in details in section F
of the online appendix. We show that exit probability depends (negatively) on demand
signals, age, and beliefs, as well as on the dynamics of firm productivity and market
conditions. Predicted exit probabilities can therefore be estimated as a function of aijkt,
εqijkt, Ageijkt and fixed effects in the ikt and jkt dimensions. We use a linear probability
model which allows the inclusion of our two high-dimensional fixed effects. Once these
survival probabilities have been estimated, we perform two different types of exercises to
check that our results are not affected by endogenous selection.
First, we gauge the importance of this selection bias by estimating (19) on sub-samples
defined according to the survival probability. This is an application of the “identification-
at-infinity” method (Chamberlain, 1986; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). The general idea
is to restrict the estimation sample to firms that are most likely to survive, the selection
bias being lower for firms with high survival probability. We allocate firms in 5 bins of
survival probability and estimate (19) on sub-samples that include only firms above the
20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles of survival probability. The results are presented in
Table A.12 (section H) in the online appendix. Starting from the full sample in column
(1), we progressively drop the quintiles of observations with the highest exit probabilities
from the sample. Accordingly, column (5) only includes the quintiles of observations with
the lowest exit probabilities (i.e. the highest survival probability). If endogenous exits
were driving our results, we would expect the patterns of belief updating to substantially
differ across samples. On the contrary, we find that the coefficients on (aijkt − εqijkt) and
25The positive coefficient on age in column (5) may appear surprising at first, but this coefficient cannot
be directly interpreted as this estimation also includes a full set of interaction terms between age and size.
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its interaction with age are extremely stable across different bins of survival probability.26
Table 5: Demand shocks and beliefs updating: controlling for endogenous exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ∆εqijkt+1 ∆ε
q
ijkt+1
Selection correction Linear Semi-parametric
aijkt − εqijkt 0.065a 0.075a 0.075a 0.065a 0.075a 0.075a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.069a 0.069a
(0.001) (0.001)
...
× Ageijkt = 9 0.054a 0.054a
(0.007) (0.007)
̂Pr(exitijkt) -0.409a -0.409a -0.409a -0.417a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Ageijkt -0.054
a -0.054a -0.054a -0.057a -0.057a -0.057a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in columns (3) and (7)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a
significant at 1%. Age dummies included alone in columns (4) and (8) but coefficients not reported. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock
from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry
of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). In columns (1)-(4), predicted exit probabilities are obtained from the estimation
of Table A.11, column (4) and introduced directly in equation (19). In columns (5) to (8), they are introduced semi-parametrically in the second
step, i.e. we included 100 bins corresponding to each percentile of the variable. Online appendix Table A.14 reports the full set of coefficients.
These results suggest that endogenous exit does not bias our results. We can go fur-
ther and try to account for a potential selection bias by including a correction term in
our estimations. Given the structure of our selection equation (which includes two high
dimensional sets of fixed effects), we cannot use probit or other maximum likelihood esti-
mators to implement a standard Heckman procedure. Instead, we follow Olsen (1980) and
include a correction term constructed from a linear estimation of the selection equation.
Crucially, Olsen’s correction term is linear, which implies that the selection equation needs
to include variables which do not appear in the second step.27 This is not a problem in
our case as ikt and jkt fixed effects can be used as exclusion variables. Results appear in
Table 5, columns (1) to (4) and are again close to our baseline estimates. Alternatively,
we can relax the linearity assumption of the correction term and use a partially linear
approach in the second step. More precisely, as suggested by Cosslett (1991), we replace
the linear correction term by a hundred indicator variables constructed from predicted exit
26In the online appendix (Table A.13), we perform a similar analysis but define quintiles based on both
exit probability and firm-market size. The results are similar.
27See Vella (1998) for a summary of Olsen (1980) and alternative procedures to correct for endogenous
sample selection. More details about the procedure appear in the online appendix, section H.
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probabilities. Results are provided in Table 5, columns (5) to (8). Again our coefficients
of interest are largely unaffected.28
5.3 Measurement issues
In section I of the online appendix, we perform some additional robustness checks. In
particular: (i) we restrict the sample to extra EU destinations to account for the different
treatment of EU trade flows by the customs (section I.1); (ii) we use alternative definitions
of firm age (section I.2); (iii) we reconstruct the years, beginning the month of the first
entry at the firm-product-destination level, to account for the fact that the first year of
export measured over a calendar year is potentially incomplete, as pointed out by Berthou
and Vicard (2015) and Bernard et al. (2017), which can affect growth rates in the first
period (section I.3); (iv) we replicate the results with equation (17) being estimated at
the 4-digit (HS4) instead of 6-digit level, as some 6-digit categories might include few
observations, leading to imprecise estimates (section I.4); and (v) we re-estimate εqijkt
and εpijkt including ijt fixed effects in equations (14) and (15) to control for the potential
informational spillovers from selling other products in the same destination (section I.5).
Each set of results is discussed in details in the online appendix. In all cases, they are
extremely close to our baseline estimates of Table 2.
Overall, the results presented in this section show that both the magnitude of belief updat-
ing and its age dependence are extremely stable across various samples and specifications,
which strongly suggests that our findings are not driven by specific sectors, firms or mod-
elling assumptions.
6 Discussion: alternative mechanisms on the demand
side?
Several alternative demand side mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to
explain firm dynamics. They mainly give rise to demand accumulation, either endogenously
or exogenously. A first category of models considers firms engaging in market-specific
investment to increase their profitability, or in a costly search for new buyers (see for
instance Ericson and Pakes, 1995, Luttmer, 2011, Eaton et al., 2014, Fitzgerald et al.,
2016). A second possibility is that firms price low in their first years to build a consumer
base (Foster et al., 2016, Gourio and Rudanko, 2014). Finally, demand could simply evolve
exogenously over time as in Ruhl and Willis (2017). All these mechanisms would generate
the increase in average sales observed over time for surviving firms that we documented in
28Online appendix Table A.15 shows the results of an alternative semi-parametric procedure consisting
in using a polynomial expansion of the first-step prediction as a correction term. We also try a standard
Heckman procedure, estimating the first step by probit without fixed effects and relying on the nonlinearity
of the inverse mills ratio in the second step to identify the selection term.
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section 2.2 (Figure 2) – and this is precisely the stylized fact that motivated many of these
papers. As already underlined, models of demand accumulation, if they do not include
some learning about demand, cannot deliver our main prediction, i.e. that firms adjust
less and less their quantities to past demand shocks as they grow older in a market. Yet,
we cannot exclude a priori the possibility that some demand accumulation is at play on
top of the updating process. Put differently, our estimates of εqijkt, which we interpret
as beliefs, could in theory reflect other types of dynamics of market-specific demand. In
this section we first show that our assumption of firms learning about a constant demand
parameter is consistent with our data, i.e. that variations in εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt can indeed be
interpreted as being driven, at least to a first order, by the updating process.29 We then
show that the variance of estimated beliefs explains a large part of the observed variance
of sales growth within cohort.
6.1 Dynamics of εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt
To further check the validity of the model, we study how the quantities and prices
residuals εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt vary with age within cohorts, as the predictions of the learning
model differ from those of demand accumulation theories. In the passive learning model,
the dynamics of εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt are affected by both within firm-markets dynamics and
selection effects. Indeed, conditional on age and fixed effects, the decision to stay or exit
the market depends on the firm’s beliefs: there is a threshold value below which firms exit
the market.30 Exit decisions thus depend on the beliefs at the beginning of the period and
on the demand shocks received. First, for a given demand shock, the smallest firms – firms
with the lowest εqijkt – are more likely to exit. Second, for a given level of beliefs, firms that
decrease in size – those facing negative demand shocks – exit more. Therefore, survivors
are firms that received positive demand shocks on average.
Dynamics of εqijkt. Both effects imply that, conditional on survival, ε
q
ijkt should grow
on average over time within cohorts. This is due to composition effects: as prior beliefs
are unbiased on average, firms have equal probabilities to update upward or downward.
Hence, when focusing on within firm-market variations (i.e. controlling for firm-product-
destination fixed effects), quantities should become much flatter.31 This is indeed what we
find in Figure 2 (the complete set of coefficients and standard errors is provided in Tables
A.23 and A.24 in the online appendix K). Figure 2.a plots the coefficients obtained when
we simply regress εqijkt on firm-market age: ε
q
ijkt sharply increases with age. When instead
we focus on variation within firms-markets (Figure 2.b), εqijkt becomes almost flat: it only
29In online appendix section J, we also implement a test proposed by Pakes and Ericson (1998) to
discriminate between models of “active”” and “passive” learning. This test mainly shows that firms’
beliefs do not follow a Markov process, a feature that should be natural in models of demand accumulation
where the decision to accumulate demand depends on firm size.
30See online appendix section F for details.
31The passive learning model actually generates positive unconditional growth rates of quantities, i.e.
even in the absence of composition effects triggered by selection. As shown in the online appendix G, this
is however a weaker prediction, as it is driven by functional form assumptions.
27
exhibits a slight positive growth in the first years, especially at age 2. This is mostly due
to the incompleteness of the first year of export measured over the calendar year; as shown
in Figure 2.c, when years are reconstructed to start the month of the first entry,32 the
increase observed in the second year almost vanishes. After 3 years, εqijkt is only 9 percent
higher than at the time of entry, and remains constant afterwards.
Figure 2: Dynamics of εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# years since last entry
quantities prices
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# years since last entry
quantities prices
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# years since last entry
quantities prices
(a) All firms (b) All firms (c) All firms
with firm-market FE with firm-market FE
(reconstructed years)
Note: This figure plots the coefficients obtained when regressing the prices and quantities residuals εqijkt
and εpijkt on a set of age dummies. Age is defined at the firm-market (firm-product-destination) level.
Panel (b) controls for firm-product-destination fixed effects. Panel (c) considers the same specification as
panel (b) but on the dataset of reconstructed years (see section I.3 in the online appendix). The complete
set of coefficients and standard errors are shown in the online appendix Table A.23 (columns (2) and (6)
for panel (a) and (4) and (8) for panel (b)) and Table A.24 (columns (3) and (6) for panel (c)).
These results contrast with the prediction of demand accumulation theories. In these
models, we would expect quantities to increase more gradually and more strongly over time.
Moreover, such an increase should not only be observed in the pooled regressions of Figure
2.a, but also in the within firms-markets estimations of Figures 2.b and 2.c.33 We do find
some growth at early age even after accounting for composition effects, which is consistent
both with demand accumulation theories and with the passive learning model. Yet, this
growth is extremely limited in magnitude and in duration, which suggests that the role of
demand accumulation processes, if any, seems modest in our data at the firm-market level.
Dynamics of εpijkt. When interpreted through the lens of the learning model, ε
p
ijkt
represents the difference between demand shocks and the firms’ expected demand. Com-
position effects imply that εpijkt should decrease over time. Because they receive positive
32See section I.3 in the online appendix.
33Note that the pattern shown in our stylized fact #2 and in Figure A.5 of the online appendix should
not be seen as evidence of some sort of demand accumulation: even in the learning model, the subsample
of firms-markets surviving the entire period grow over time, as they received positive demand shocks on
average.
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demand shocks on average, survivors initially set their price above their optimal pricing
rule, to “jump” on realized demand. They next update their beliefs, which progressively
become more accurate over time. εpijkt should thus decrease on average and converge to-
ward its steady state value. But again, controlling for firm-market fixed effects, εpijkt should
remain constant. These predictions are confirmed in Figure 2: without firm-market fixed
effects, εpijkt is decreasing in age, although the effect is quantitatively limited (Figure 2.a).
This is what the passive learning model predicts as changes in the firm beliefs are sup-
posed to affect more ∆εqijkt than ∆ε
p
ijkt.
34 Note that all coefficients statistically differ from
zero at conventional levels (Table A.23). More importantly, when composition effects are
accounted for, prices become flat (Figures 2.b and 2.c).
While consistent with the learning model, these findings are difficult to reconcile with
theories of demand accumulation. In models where such accumulation is driven by firm
pricing policy (i.e. pricing low in the first years to attract consumers), prices of young
firms should be lower than those of experienced exporters: εpijkt should increase over time
in Figures 2.b and 2.c. If demand accumulation is not driven by firm pricing, prices should
stay constant over time; they should not decline with age as in Figure 2.a.35 Overall, the
results shown in Figure 2 therefore support our interpretation of εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt as being
mostly driven by the updating process.36
6.2 The variance of firms’ growth
We have seen in section 2.2 (Figure 1) that the variance of observed growth rates within
market-specific cohorts of firms decline with the age of the cohort conditional on size, a
fact that does not arise naturally in models where learning is absent.37 On the other hand,
with learning, younger firms update more than older firms and so have larger growth rates
in absolute value. It follows that the variance of firms growth decreases with the cohort
tenure on a specific market. As formally shown in the appendix, we get the following
prediction which is a direct consequence of firm updating:
Prediction # 3 (variance of growth rate): The within cohort variances of growth rates of
Zqijkt and Z
p
ijkt decrease with cohort age.
34The magnitude of the difference in growth rates should be a factor σk (equations (14) and (15)), which
is indeed close to what we find in Table A.23 when comparing the price and quantity equations.
35The price decrease we find in Figure 2.a also suggests that at least part of the updating process we
uncover is directly about demand. Indeed, if firms were fully informed about the demand function (and
would learn about something else, for instance productivity), they would choose a quantity - prices couple
on the demand function and prices should not deviate from the optimal pricing rule.
36This does not imply that demand accumulation processes are not relevant to explain other dimensions
of firm dynamics. For instance, firms may accumulate demand due to investment or marketing expenses
that affect simultaneously their sales in many markets, or because of product-specific trends in consumer
tastes: firms with the “right” product would experience positive growth in demand. Since these elements
are purged from our quantities and prices residuals, we cannot infer their importance.
37The literature has however proposed mechanisms allowing to explain the decline in variance of growth
rate with size, conditional on age (see for instance Luttmer, 2011).
29
We test this prediction by estimating the following equation:
V
(
∆εXijkt
)
= δX × AGEcjkt + FEcjk + uijkt ∀X = {q, p} (20)
where FEcjk represent cohort fixed effects. As in section 2.2, a cohort of new exporters on
a product-destination market is defined as all firms entering market jk in year t. We again
expect our coefficient of interest δX to be negative: because firms update less their beliefs
when they gain experience in a market, their quantities and prices become less volatile.
Using the estimated coefficients from (20), we can also check whether the variance of the
growth in beliefs match the observed variance of sales growth.
Figure 3: Impact of firm-market specific age conditional on size: predicted patterns
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Note: this figure plots the variance of quantities, prices and values residuals within cohort over age on each product-destination
market. The coefficients are shown in columns (2) and (6) in table A.25 and column (2) in table A.26 respectively. The
coefficients on the growth and variance of growth of sales from figure 1.a.
Figure 3 shows the results. We plot the variance of the growth of quantities (beliefs)
and prices residuals, as well as of the predicted value of sales and compare it with the
observed variance of sales growth. The full set of estimates appear in online appendix L.
Within cohort, the variance of the growth rate of both beliefs and prices residuals sharply
decreases with age in all columns. Note that this is still true when controlling for the
number of observations in the cohort, for average size, or for attrition by concentrating on
the firms-markets which survive over the entire period (see Tables A.25 and A.26). The
variance of εqijkt follows quite closely the variance of observed sales. Again, given that this
decline in variance with age conditional on size cannot be explained by models without
learning, this provides further support for the learning model.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided direct evidence that passive learning about demand is
an important determinant of firm dynamics. We derived a core prediction from a stan-
dard model of market-specific firm dynamics incorporating Bayesian learning about local
demand that theories without learning cannot generate: a demand signal leads firms to
update their beliefs, especially when they are young. Combining the structure of the model
with detailed exporter-level data, we developed a methodology to identify demand shocks
and firms beliefs about demand.
The learning process generates the decline in the growth rates and their variance within
cohort with firms’ age found in the data. Our framework is also consistent with hetero-
geneous patterns of growth of surviving firms since over-optimistic firms upon entry may
experience negative growth. We have focused on a specific dimension of firm dynamics –
the post-entry firm behavior at the product-destination level –, yet this dimension explains
more than half of the variance in overall firm growth.
Our results open several paths for future research. An implication of the model is
that the learning process creates a form of hysteresis: the most experienced firms are
less sensitive to demand shocks in terms of sales and exit decisions. This suggests that
aggregate uncertainty shocks, thought as an increase in the dispersion of micro-level shocks
(Bloom et al., 2014), should have heterogeneous effects across industries depending on their
age structure. Another natural extension of our paper would be to go beyond post-entry
dynamics and extend our framework to include explicitly informational spillovers across
products, destinations or firms. Such spillovers could affect firms’ entry decisions and size
upon entry. Quantifying the respective contributions of each of these sources of information
to firm dynamics would bear direct policy relevance.
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A Appendix - Detailed derivations and proofs
Optimal quantities and prices. Firms choose quantities by maximizing expected profits
subject to demand. Using (1), we get:
max
q
∫
piijktdGt−1(aijkt) = max
q
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And from the constraint, we get p∗ijkt =
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Updating of firm’s beliefs about expected demand. First note that firm i has a
prior about the demand shock given by aijkt ∼ N (θ˜ijkt−1, σ˜2ijkt−1 + σ2ε) and thus e
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ijkt (see (3) and (4)), it is easy to show
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This leads to the equation we test in the main text:
∆εqijkt+1 =gt
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
+gt
σ2ε
2σk
(21)
Prediction 1. Prediction 1 states that aijkt−εqijkt, has a larger impact on firms’ updating,
the younger the firms are. Using (21), we immediately get:
∂∆εqijkt+1
∂
(
aijkt − εqijkt
) = gt > 0
Updating is larger for younger firms, as gt decreases with t.
Prediction 2: Impact of market uncertainty. Moreover, the updating process is also
affected by the level of market uncertainty σ2 . Formally:
∂2
(
∆εqijkt+1
)
∂
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
∂σ2
= − g
2
t
σ2jk0
< 0
Updating decreases with uncertainty, as a signal is less informative when market uncer-
tainty is larger. As a consequence, market uncertainty dampens the speed of learning. In
other words, updating decreases less with age, the more uncertain the market. This can
be seen noting that:
∂2
(
∆εqijkt+1
)
∂
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
∂t
= − 1(
σ2
σ2jk0
+ t
)2
which is larger (less negative) in more uncertain markets (with larger σ2 ).
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Dynamics of prices and quantities. The model predicts expected growth rates of
opposite signs for quantities and prices. This result comes from (14) and (15). Taking the
first difference of these equations in expected terms, we directly get the expected growth
rates. We find:
E
[
∆ lnZqijkt+1
]
= − 1
σk
E
[
∆ lnZpijkt+1
]
Given that firms that decrease in size will on average be more likely to exit, the expected
growth rate of quantities must be positive for survivors. Hence, the expected growth rate
of prices for these firms should be negative and smaller by a factor − 1
σk
. Quantitatively,
this is very close to what we find in table A.23.
Prediction 3. Prediction 3 states that the variance of growth rates within cohort decrease
with cohort age. The variance of these growth rates can be expressed as:
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First, aijkt+1 and aijkt being drawn from the same distribution, V [∆aijkt+1] = 2σ2 . Second,
using (11), we get:
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As E [∆aijkt+1] = 0, we get:
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Expanding this expression and using the fact that aijkt and aijkt+1 are independent and
that E [aijkt] = E [aijkt+1] = aijkt−1, we get:
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Finally, plugging this term into (22) and (23) and after rearranging, we get the following
expressions which are both strictly decreasing with t:
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A Data and descriptive evidence on firm dynamics
A.1 Dataset construction
We use data on values and quantities sold by French firms, by destination, HS6 product
and year, over the period 1994-2005. We focus on the subset of HS6 product categories
that remain stable in the HS classification over the period in order to be able to track
firms over time on specific markets.4 As we use the first two years to define entry, we
concentrate on the years 1996-2005. Note that firms-products-destinations that already
export at the beginning of the period (in 1994 or 1995) are not considered, as we are
interested in post-entry dynamics.
Because intra-EU and extra-EU flows are treated differently by the French Customs, we
harmonize the data in several ways. The declaration of extra-EU export flows is mandatory
when a transaction exceeds 1,000 euros or 1,000 kg. For shipments to EU countries, firms
have to report their detailed expeditions when their total exports to all EU countries exceed
a threshold over the year of 38,100 euros before 2001, 99,100 euros in 2001 and 100,000
euros between 2002 and 2005. Firms below the reporting threshold are required to fill a
simplified form without the details on the product exported and the destination market.
In order to harmonize the data requirement over the different destinations, we drop all
intra-EU export flows below 1,000 euros, as well as firms that report at least once under
the simplified procedure (as for these firms, we do not observe their flows in all markets).
We also check that all our results are unchanged when removing EU destinations from the
sample.
A.2 Additional descriptive evidence
This section provides further details on the computation of the stylized facts presented in
section 2 of the main text.
Contribution to aggregate sales growth. The literature has documented the essential
contribution of young firms to industry dynamics, either in terms of aggregate output,
employment or trade. Haltiwanger et al. (2013) show for instance that US start-ups display
substantially higher rates of job creation and destruction in their first ten years, and that
these firms represent a large share of total employment after a decade of existence. These
patterns are also found for other countries (see Criscuolo et al., 2014 for evidence on
18 OECD countries; Lawless (2014) on Irish firms, Ayyagari et al., 2011 for developing
countries). Similar facts characterize trade dynamics: Eaton et al. (2008) and Bernard
et al. (2009) show that exporters start small but that, conditional on survival, they account
for large shares of total export growth after a few years.
4The frequent changes in the combined nomenclature (CN8) prevents us to use this further degree of
disaggregation of the customs’ product classification.
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Our exporter-level data exhibit comparable features. We compute the contribution of
the intensive margin (incumbent firm×product×destination) and the firm- and firm-market
extensive margins to the growth of total French exports on a year-on-year basis or over the
entire time frame of the sample (between 1996 and 2005). We use mid-point growth rates
to account for entries and exits Bricongne et al. (2012). Initial size relates to firms’ sales
the first year of entry on a specific market on which they export up to 2005.
Over the 1996-2005 period, we find that, on average, new firm-destination-product
triplets represent only 12.3% of total export value after a year, but their share reaches
53.5% after a decade (27.3% due to new markets served by incumbents and 26.2% by new
firms exporting, see Table A.1). The contribution of the extensive margin to aggregate
exports is determined by three components of firm dynamics: entry, survival and post
entry growth on new markets. Since new exporters typically do not survive more than a
few years in export markets,5 firm selection and growth are important drivers of aggregate
trade growth over longer horizons, besides the size at entry. Column (2) of Table A.1
shows that pure growth after entry accounts for around 40% of the end-of-period share of
newly created firm-destination-product triplets. The objective of our paper is precisely to
understand how learning about demand can explain this post-entry dynamics.
Table A.1: Shares in end-of-period French aggregate exports
(1) (2)
Average Overall
yoy 1996/2005 1996/2005
New exporters 2.4% 25.9%
Initial size - 16.4%
Growth since entry - 9.6%
New product-destination 9.9% 27.7%
Initial size - 16.7%
Growth since entry - 11.0%
Incumbent exporter-product-destination 87.7% 46.4%
Total 100% 100%
Note: Source: French Customs. Column (1) presents the average contribution to year-on-year growth
rates, i.e. the contribution of each subcomponent to the yearly growth rates, observed for each year of
our sample, then averaged across years. Column (2) reports the contributions of each subcomponent to
the total growth of French exports between 1996 and 2005. Initial entry measures firms’ sales the year of
first entry on a specific market on which they still export in 2005; and growth since entry measures the
contribution of sales growth between the first entry and 2005.
Firm-product-destination specific factors are a key component of sales’ growth.
We decompose the variance of sales growth, in a way similar in spirit to Eaton et al.
5For French exporters, the average survival rate at the firm-product-destination level is 32% between
the first and second year, and 9% over a five-year horizon.
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(2011).6 We first regress firm-market specific sales growth on a set of destination-product-
time dummies. The R2 of such a regression is 0.14: market-specific dynamics play a
limited role. Adding firm-product-time fixed effects increases the R2 to 0.46, suggesting
that supply-side factors such as productivity do a good job at explaining variations of
firms’ sales over time. However, it appears clearly that sales growth remains largely driven
by firm-market specific factors. Our paper concentrates on this part of firm dynamics,
with the objective of understanding the extent to which it is consistent with firms learning
about their demand.
Table A.2: Decomposition of the variance of sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var. Growth of exports Value of exports
Product-destination-time FE Yes Yes - -
Firm-product-time FE - Yes - -
Product-destination FE - - Yes -
Firm-product FE - - Yes -
Firm-product-destination FE - - - Yes
R2 0.14 0.46 0.57 0.80
Note: OLS estimations based on French customs data. Each column contains the R2 of a separate regression of the dependent
variable on a specific set of fixed effects.
Firm-market growth and its variance decline with age, conditional on size.
Columns (1), (4) and (5) of Table A.3 below shows the coefficients used to plot Fig-
ure 1 of the main text. Column (2) shows that similar results for firm growth are ob-
tained when including in the estimations firm×product×year fixed effects. Specifications
reported in columns (1)-(3) include dummies by decile of firms size computed by HS4-
product×destination, and HS2 sector and year fixed effects. Firms size is defined as aver-
age firm×product×destination sales over t and t− 1 (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. The exit probability in column (3) is estimated using
a linear probability model. Column (4) includes year fixed effects and controls for aver-
age size, computed as the mean of average sales over t and t − 1 across firms by cohort.
Standard errors are clustered at the market level.
Post-entry growth dynamics are heterogenous across survivors. Finally, Figures
6Eaton et al. (2011) show, using firm-destination data, that firm-specific effects explain well the prob-
ability of serving a market (57%), but less so sales variations conditional on selling in a market (39%).
Munch and Nguyen (2014) find that the mean contribution of the firm component to unconditional sales
variations is 49%. They also show that the firm-specific effects are more important for firms already es-
tablished in a product-destination market. Lawless and Whelan (2014) find an adjusted pseudo-R2 of 45%
on a sample of Irish exporters.
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Table A.3: Age, growth and volatility of sales and exit rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Growth Exit Variance
value (log) probability of growth
value (log)
Ageijkt = 1 0.296
a
(0.009)
Ageijkt = 2 0.437
a 0.398a 0.169a 0.389a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015)
Ageijkt = 3 0.132
a 0.174a 0.093a 0.258a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
Ageijkt = 4 0.079
a 0.105a 0.052a 0.189a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
Ageijkt = 5 0.055
a 0.069a 0.025a 0.138a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
Ageijkt = 6 0.047
a 0.049a 0.008 0.093a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
Ageijkt = 7 0.032
b 0.031b -0.002 0.054a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
Ageijkt = 8 0.033
b 0.031b -0.007 0.040b
(0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016)
Ageijkt = 9 0.018 0.011 0.038
b
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 1 -0.251a -0.156a 0.326a
(0.012) (0.021) (0.004)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 2 -0.219a -0.142a 0.290a
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 3 -0.210a -0.193a 0.258a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 4 -0.189a -0.175a 0.228a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 5 -0.169a -0.156a 0.197a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 6 -0.143a -0.130a 0.163a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 7 -0.120a -0.105a 0.133a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 8 -0.090a -0.077a 0.097a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Sizeijkt/t−1 - decile 9 -0.051a -0.039a 0.055a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Average Sizecjkt/t−1 0.022a
(0.001)
Observations 1,666,317 1,456,113 3,061,865 348,536
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (HS2) FE Yes Yes Yes -
Firm-product-year FE - Yes - -
Robust standard errors clustered by firm (respectively destination-product in columns (4)) in parentheses. c significant at
10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Size computed as average size in t and t+ 1; size bins by decile are computed
at the destination-product(HS4) level. The omitted age category is 10 years.
A.1 and A.2 show that the heterogenous growth dynamics of quantities that we discuss in
the main text also hold for the value of sales, and for different cohorts of firm-markets.
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Figure A.1: Sales dynamics over time for surviving firms
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Note: This figure plots statistics about market-specific firm sales values with respect to age. Values are normalized to 1
in age 2. The upper and lower limits of the boxes represent the first and last quartiles of the variable, with the median in
between.
Figure A.2: Quantity dynamics over time for surviving firms: robustness
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
ln
 q
ua
nt
ity
 (w
.r.t
. a
ge
 2)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Market specific age (# years since last entry)
1997 cohort
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
ln
 q
ua
nt
ity
 (w
.r.t
. a
ge
 2)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Market specific age (# years since last entry)
1998 cohort
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
ln
 q
ua
nt
ity
 (w
.r.t
. a
ge
 2)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Market specific age (# years since last entry)
1999 cohort
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
ln
 q
ua
nt
ity
 (w
.r.t
. a
ge
 2)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Market specific age (# years since last entry)
2000 cohort
Note: This figure plots statistics about market-specific firm quantities with respect to age. Quantities are normalized to 1
in age 2. The upper and lower limits of the boxes represent the first and last quartiles of the variable, with the median in
between.
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B Elasticity of substitution estimates
Table A.4 reports the descriptive statistics on the elasticities of substitution estimated from
equation 18, for the full estimation sample (upper panel) and across HS6 products (lower
panel). We first report the overall estimates, then the statistics obtained when products
with insignificant β coefficients (at the 5% level) are removed from the sample, and finally
the statistics obtained when products with σk < 1 are excluded. As can be seen from the
upper panel, insignificant coefficients only represent 1.6% of the observations in the final
sample, while dropping theory inconsistent elasticities (lower than 1) further eliminates
only 0.1% of the observations. This clearly show that, whenever we can precisely estimate
these elasticities, we get plausible coefficients.
Across products, our estimates yield a mean (resp. median) σk of 7.17 (resp. 5.51) after
dropping insignificant or theory-inconsistent ones (lower panel). The median is largely
unaffected by our cleaning rules. Except in the case in which insignificant estimates are
kept, the distribution of σk does not contain extreme value: the 99% is equal to 28.7. The
last three rows report σk for different categories of products according to the Rauch (1999)’s
liberal classification. As expected, differentiated goods exhibit a mean (resp. median) of 6.2
(resp. 5.2), lower than referenced priced goods (9.1 and 7.2 respectively) and homogenous
goods (11.1 and 9.0 resp.). Those means are statistically different at the 1% level, with
t-stat of -12.4 (differentiated vs. referenced), -13.3 (differentiated vs. homogenous), and
-3.1 (referenced vs. homogenous).
Table A.4: Statistics on elasticities of substitution
Obs. Mean S.D. 1% 25% Median 75% 99%
Full sample
σk, all estimates 1883748 7.30 60.42 2.21 3.58 5.11 6.70 33.06
σk, if β significant 1854359 6.20 4.79 2.24 3.57 5.09 6.59 26.16
σk, if β significant and σk > 1 1854141 6.20 4.78 2.24 3.57 5.09 6.59 26.16
Across HS6 products
σk, all estimates 3542 13.91 221.62 -69.55 3.82 5.83 10.27 116.10
σk, if β significant 2780 7.10 5.55 1.68 3.86 5.49 8.41 28.73
σk, if β significant and σk > 1 2767 7.17 5.47 1.89 3.88 5.51 8.42 28.73
σk, if > 1, differentiated goods 1778 6.24 4.21 2.00 3.77 5.17 7.20 21.82
σk, if > 1, referenced priced goods 670 9.09 6.78 1.80 4.46 7.24 11.61 32.98
σk, if > 1, homogenous goods 159 11.14 8.71 1.63 5.23 8.97 15.07 50.82
Source: Authors computations from French Customs data. Elasticities of substitution estimated from equation (17). σk, if
significant β means that we keep only the estimate when β estimated from equation (17) is statistically different from zero at
the 5% level. σk, if > 1 means that we further drop the observation if σk > 1. The classification of goods into differentiated,
referenced priced and homogeneous comes from Rauch (1999).
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C Main results – Graphical representation
The figures below depicts the coefficients of 2, column (4). Equation (18) predicts that
these coefficient should follow the following shape: gt =
1
σ2ε/σ
2
jk0+t
with gt measuring the
speed of learning. To determine whether our set of estimated coefficients significantly differ
from this shape, in Figure we have taken year 2 (the first coefficient) as a benchmark; from
this coefficient we can infer the value of σ2ε/σ
2
jk0 ≈ 12. Assuming the coefficient of year 2
is indeed correct, the shape of our coefficients is quite similar to the one implied by our
functional form assumption.
We can go further and test this restriction: does our model perform significantly better
than a model in which we would constrain the coefficients (from year 3 onwards) to follow
the shape of gt? When we test these restrictions, they are rejected at the 5% level: the shape
implied by our coefficient is different from the one implied by the normality assumption
(the p-value associated with the hypothesis that the models are the same is 0.02). However,
as is apparent in Figure R3.1 below, this is mostly due to a difference in the coefficients
after age 5. In fact, when we consider all coefficients but the one of year 6, the restrictions
are no longer rejected (the p-value of 0.17). When we concentrate on the first four years
(for which we have more observations and therefore more precise estimates), the p-value
of the F-test of the restrictions is as high as 0.66.
Figure A.3: Functional form assumption
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Note: This figure plot the coefficient and 95% confidence intervals from Table 2, column (4), and the coefficient implied by our functional form
assumption gt = 1/(σ
2
ε/σ
2
jk0+t). At age 2 we assume that the coefficient is correctly estimated and infer the rest of the theory-based coefficient
from the expression of gt.
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D Belief updating and uncertainty
To illustrate the impact of uncertainty on the updating process and how it evolves with
age, we split our sample into markets with low (below the first quartile of uncertainty)
and high (above the third quartile) uncertainty in Table A.5 and Figure A.4. We still
find evidence for the updating process on both sub-samples but the average level of belief
updating following a demand shock is larger on less uncertain markets (0.171 versus 0.035
for firms of age two). As expected from prediction 2, the profile of learning is also flatter
on more uncertain markets.
Figure A.4: Uncertainty and belief updating
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The figure plots the coefficients of regressions similar to Table 2, column (4), ran on two different sub-samples defined according to the market
level of uncertainty (below the first quartile and above the third quartile). Uncertainty is computed as the standard deviation of the demand
shocks aijkt, computed by market. Grey areas represent 90% confidence bands.
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Table A.5: Prediction 1: the role of uncertainty (subsamples)
(1) (2)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Uncertainty High Low
(aijkt − εqijkt) × Ageijkt = 2 0.035a 0.171a
(0.001) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.032a 0.153a
(0.001) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.028a 0.152a
(0.001) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.028a 0.150a
(0.002) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.031a 0.142a
(0.002) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.026a 0.131a
(0.002) (0.006)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.027a 0.136a
(0.003) (0.009)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.023a 0.131a
(0.004) (0.010)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.021a 0.128a
(0.006) (0.013)
Observations 454040 438324
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Age dummies included
alone but coefficients not reported. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future
demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit).
Uncertainty is the standard deviation of aijkt, computed by market. High and low mean above the third quartile and below the first quartile
of the uncertainty variable.
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E Extensions of the model
We consider in this section alternative versions of the model and discuss their implications
for our identification strategy.
E.1 Firms set price first, monopolistic competition
Let us first consider the opposite of our baseline assumption: prices are set first, before
demand shocks are realized. Once the demand shock is observed, firms then choose quan-
tities. The maximization problem becomes:
max
p
∫
piijktdGt−1(aijkt) s.t. qijkt = eaijktp
−σk
ijkt
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
max
p
p1−σkijkt
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
Et−1 [eaijkt ]− wit
ϕikt
Et−1 [eaijkt ] p−σkijkt
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
− Fijk
From the FOC and the constraint we get:
p∗ijkt =
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕikt
q∗ijkt = e
aijkt
(
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕikt
)−σk µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
With constant price elasticity, firms choose prices as constant mark-ups over marginal
costs: prices do not depend on sales, but solely on supply side characteristics. Quantities
then adjust to the demand level. Therefore, if prices are determined before observing the
demand shocks, while quantities can fully adjust to it, neither prices nor quantities depend
on firm beliefs. We would get:
εqijkt = lnZ
q
ijkt = aijkt
εpijkt = lnZ
p
ijkt = 0
Regressing εpijkt on ε
q
ijkt should generate insignificant β̂ coefficients and the absolute value
of εqijkt should not decrease with age.
E.2 Firms set price first, oligopolistic competition
Second, we consider the case of an oligopolistic market structure with Bertrand competition
(so still price first), to allow for variable markups. Formally, we assume that consumers in
country j maximize utility derived from the consumption of goods from K sectors. Each
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sector is composed of a small enough set of differentiated varieties of product k:
Uj = E
+∞∑
t=0
βt ln (Cjt) , with Cjt =
K∏
k=0
Cµkjkt
and Cjkt =
(∑
Ωkt
(eaijkt)
1
σk qijkt(ω)
σk−1
σk dω
) σk
(σk−1)
with Ωkt the (small enough) set of varieties of product k available at time t. We assume
that firms take income Yjt as constant, i.e. we assume that K is large enough.
The upper tier utility maximization implies Cjkt =
µkYjt
Pjkt
. It follows the demand in
market j at time t for a variety of product k:
qijkt = e
aijktp−σkijkt
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
= Cjkte
aijkt
p−σkijkt
P−σkjkt
with the price index of sector k in country j defined as:
Pjkt =
(∑
Ωkt
eaijktp1−σkijkt di
) 1
1−σk
The firm maximization program writes:
max
p
∫
piijktdGt−1(aijkt) s.t. qijkt = eaijktp
−σk
ijkt
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
It follows:
p∗ijkt =
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
wit
ϕikt
q∗ijkt = e
aijkt
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
wit
ϕikt
)−σk µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
with
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)] = σk − (σk − 1)Et−1 [sijkt]
where Et−1 [sijkt] is the expected market share at the beginning of period t. The residuals
from the estimation in logs with fixed effects are:
εqijkt = aijkt − σk ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
εpijkt = ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
As the demand shock now appears in the residual quantities, we regress εqijkt on ε
p
ijkt:
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aijkt − σk ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
= β
(
ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
))
+ λijk + vijkt
We obtain:
β̂ = −σk and v̂ijkt = εijkt
and
λ̂ijk + v̂ijkt = aijkt
To test this alternative specification, we look at the dynamics of prices, that reflect the
evolution of firms beliefs:
∆εpijkt+1 = ∆ ln
(
Et [ε(sijkt)]
Et [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
As
∂(Et−1[ε(sijkt)])
∂(Et−1[sijkt])
< 0, a positive shock (i.e. generating a positive updating) implies
a decrease in the expected price elasticity and an increase in markup. In Table A.6, we
assess the empirical relevance of this alternative model. We do not find evidence of a
positive relationship between prices and demand shocks. Overall, our data are therefore
not consistent with the assumption of firms choosing their price first.
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Table A.6: Prediction 1: demand shocks and beliefs updating (assuming Bertrand)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. ∆εpijkt+1
aijkt -0.004
a -0.005a -0.005a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 -0.003a
(0.001)
× Ageijkt = 3 -0.001a
(0.000)
× Ageijkt = 4 -0.001a
(0.000)
× Ageijkt = 5 -0.000
(0.000)
× Ageijkt = 6 -0.001a
(0.000)
× Ageijkt = 7 -0.001a
(0.000)
× Ageijkt = 8 -0.000
(0.000)
× Ageijkt = 9 -0.000
(0.000)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.001
(0.000)
Ageijkt 0.001
a 0.001a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1883748 1883748 1883748 1883748
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in column (3)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at
1%. Age dummies included alone in columns (4) but coefficients not reported. Shocks aijkt are computed assuming Bertrand competition, i.e.
by regressing ε
q
ijkt
on ε
p
ijkt
instead of the opposite. See text for more details. Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the firm
on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit).
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E.3 Partial quantity adjustment
Here, we maintain our assumption that quantities are set first, but allow firms to observe
part of the demand shock before taking their quantity decision. Prices then fully adjust
once the other part of the demand shock is observed.
Suppose that the demand shock aijkt can be decomposed into 2 components: aijkt =
a1ijkt + a
2
ijkt, with a
1
ijkt ∼ N
(
a1ijk, ςσ
2
ε
)
, a2ijkt ∼ N
(
a2ijk, (1− ς)σ2ε
)
and a1ijk + a
2
ijk = aijk.
Firms can observe a1ijkt before taking their quantity decision. a
2
ijkt is then realized and
firms fully adjust their prices. For simplicity, we assume that a1ijkt does not bring additional
information, i.e. Cov(a1ijkt, a
2
ijkt) = 0.
a1ijk and ς capture the relative importance of the first (observed) shock and therefore
the importance of the learning process for firms: if a1ijkt captures the entire demand shock
(aijk = a
1
ijk and ς = 1), there is nothing to learn about. Beliefs are only related to a
2
ijkt,
the part of the demand shock which is not observed at the time of the quantity decision.
The distribution of beliefs is now described by Gt−1(a2ijkt).
After having observed a1ijkt, firms choose quantities by maximizing expected profits
subject to demand. We get:
max
q
∫
piijktdGt−1(a2ijkt) = max
q
q
1− 1
σk
ijkt
(
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
) 1
σk
e
a1ijkt
σk Et−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
]
− wit
ϕikt
qijkt − Fijk.
The constraint can now be written pijkt =
(
µkYjte
a1ijkte
a2ijkt
qijktP
1−σk
jkt
) 1
σk
. From the FOC and the
constraint we get:
p∗ijkt =
(
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕikt
) e
a2ijkt
σk
Et−1
[
e
a2
ijkt
σk
]

q∗ijkt =
(
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕikt
)−σk ( µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
)
ea
1
ijktEt−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
]σk
.
As before, quantities depend on firms’ beliefs while prices are still a constant markup over
marginal cost in expected terms. We get:
εqijkt = lnZ
q
ijkt = a
1
ijkt + σk lnEt−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
]
εpijkt = lnZ
p
ijkt =
1
σk
a2ijkt − lnEt−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
]
.
Note that if a1ijk = aijk and ς = 1, all the demand shock is observed and ε
q
ijkt captures the
demand shock only while εpijkt does not depend neither on the demand shock, nor on firm
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beliefs (which are irrelevant in that case). This case is equivalent to the one where prices
are set first. If on the other hand a1ijk = ς = 0, we are back to our baseline assumption of
fixed quantities. Importantly, all our theoretical predictions still hold in the intermediate
case. In particular, equation (11) still describes the evolution of beliefs, which are now
related to the distribution of a2ijkt.
Identification. If quantities can partly adjust, εqijkt captures both the firm beliefs and
part of the demand shock, i.e. our measure of beliefs becomes noisy. This is innocuous
when looking at the dynamics of εqijkt (see 6.1) or when looking at the relationship between
the variance of growth rates and age cohorts (see 6.2), but it has implications for the
identification of the demand shocks vijkt. Regressing ε
p
ijkt on ε
q
ijkt gives:(
1
σk
a2ijkt − lnEt−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
])
= β
(
a1ijkt + σk lnEt−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
])
+ λijk + vijkt.
It follows:
β̂ = − 1
σk
ΛP with ΛP =
V
 ˜σk lnEt−1 [ea2ijktσk ]

V
 ˜σk lnEt−1 [ea2ijktσk ]
+ V(a˜1ijkt)
where variables with the sign˜ are demeaned in the ijk dimension. We get 0 < ΛP < 1:
β̂ is underestimated due to the attenuation bias introduced by the noisy measure of firms’
beliefs.
Hence, the estimated shock λ̂ijk + v̂ijkt may be biased, but the direction of this bias is
unclear as we would like now to isolate a2ijkt and not aijkt = a
1
ijkt + a
2
ijkt. Indeed, firms now
form beliefs about the part of the demand shock which is not observed at the time of the
quantity decision. v̂ijkt may thus be larger or smaller than a
2
ijkt.
Suppose for instance that ΛP = 1/2. This implies that V
 ˜σk lnEt−1 [ea2ijktσk ]
 =
V
(
a˜1ijkt
)
. In this case our estimated demand shock would be:
λ̂ijk + v̂ijkt =
1
σk
a2ijkt + 2σk
(
a1ijkt − σk lnEt−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
])
The direction of the bias depends on, among σk lnEt−1
[
e
a2ijkt
σk
]
and a1ijkt, which one is the
most important component of εqijkt.
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Equation under test. We obtain:
∆εqijkt+1 = σk∆ ln Et
[
e
a2ijkt+1
σk
]
+ ∆a1ijkt+1
It is worth noting that ∆εqijkt still fully captures the updating process, as ∆a
1
ijkt+1 = 0 in
expected terms. It is now about the true value of a2ijk. We get: ∆θ˜t = gt
(
a2ijkt − θ˜t−1
)
,
and thus ∆ lnEt
[
e
a2ijkt+1
σk
]
= 1
σk
(
∆θ˜t +
σ˜2t−σ˜2t−1
2σk
)
.
It follows:
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
(
a2ijkt − θ˜t−1 −
σ˜2t−1 − σ˜2t
gt2σk
)
+ ∆a1ijkt+1
Further,
θ˜ijkt−1 = ε
q
ijkt −
σ˜2t−1 + σ
2
ε
2σk
− a1ijkt
Hence:
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
(
a2ijkt − εqijkt
)
+ gt
(
σ2ε
2σk
+ a1ijkt
)
+ ∆a1ijkt+1
The possibility of some partial quantity adjustment may just generate some extra un-
conditional growth at the firm-market level (see the second term), as ∆a1ijkt+1 = 0 in
expected terms. So, beyond the fact that a2ijkt may be biased upwards or downwards, our
strategy is left unaffected.
How this potential bias may affect our results on beliefs updating (prediction 1)? Con-
sider our baseline specification, equation (19). There are two distinct issues here. First, α̂1
– the average extent of belief updating – might be upward or downward biased, depending
on the direction of the bias of our estimated demand shocks. Second, if this bias depends
on firm-market age, this may affect how α̂1 evolves with age, which is key for our findings.
As discussed in the main text, a simple way to gauge the importance of this issue is to
focus on sectors or destinations for which quantities are more likely to be rigid (those for
which λ̂ijk + v̂ijkt is more likely to be correctly estimated) and to compare the results with
our baseline estimates of Table 2. We expect less quantity adjustment for complex goods
(in which many different relationship-specific inputs are used in the production process)
and in destinations characterized by longer time-to-ship. In Table A.7, we restrict our
sample to sectors or destinations which are above the sample median in terms of time-to-
ship or input complexity. Data on sector-specific complexity comes from Nunn (2007), and
data on time-to-ship between France’s main port (Le Havre) and each of the destinations’
main port from Berman et al. (2013).
Results in Table A.7 show that the updating of the firms’ beliefs following a demand
shock is quantitatively close to our baseline estimates (columns (1) and (4)), which suggests
that the bias of our estimated demand shocks, if any, is limited. Further, the coefficient on
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Table A.7: Prediction 1: robustness (fixed quantities)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1 ∆ε
q
ijk,t+1
Sample Long time-to-ship Complex goods
aijkt − εqijkt 0.072a 0.081a 0.077a 0.084a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt -0.003b -0.002a
(0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.075a 0.080a
(0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.071a 0.078a
(0.003) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.068a 0.075a
(0.004) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.062a 0.070a
(0.005) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.069a 0.074a
(0.005) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.068a 0.071a
(0.008) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.062a 0.072a
(0.010) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.063a 0.065a
(0.013) (0.008)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.040b 0.079a
(0.018) (0.012)
Ageijkt -0.029
a -0.029a -0.031a -0.031a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 358418 358418 358418 800015 800015 800015
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. aijkt is
our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17); εqijkt is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14).
Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Age dummies
included alone in columns (3) and (6) but coefficients not reported. Complex goods means in the above the sample median
of the variable, and large time-to-ship above the median for extra-EU observations. Data on sector-specific complexity comes
from Nunn (2007), and data on time-to-ship between France’s main port (Le Havre) and each of the destinations’ main port
from Berman et al. (2013).
the interaction term between demand shocks and age (columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6)), is also
similar our baseline estimates. The coefficient on the interaction term between demand
shocks and age is slightly lower than our baseline in the case of complex goods (col. (5) of
Table A.7). In column (6), however, we see that this result is only driven by effect of the
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last age category, 10 years of experience, which is itself quite imprecisely estimated.
Altogether, these results suggest that our assumption of fixed quantities should not be
rejected in light of our data.
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E.4 Oligopolistic Competition - Cournot
We investigate here the possibility that firms markups are variable. To do so, we consider
the same model as before, but assume that competition is oligopolistic within sectors and
not monopolistic. Formally, we assume that consumers in country j maximize utility
derived from the consumption of goods from K sectors. Each sector is composed of a small
enough set of differentiated varieties of product k:
Uj = E
+∞∑
t=0
βt ln (Cjt) , with Cjt =
K∏
k=0
Cµkjkt
and Cjkt =
(∑
Ωkt
(eaijkt)
1
σk qijkt(ω)
σk−1
σk dω
) σk
(σk−1)
with ρ the discount factor. Ωkt the (small enough) set of varieties of product k available at
time t, and
∑K µk = 1. We assume that firms take income Yjt as constant, i.e. we assume
that K is large enough.
The upper tier utility maximization implies Cjkt =
µkYjt
Pjkt
. It follows the demand in
market j at time t for a variety of product k:
qijkt = e
aijktp−σkijkt
µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
= Cjkte
aijkt
p−σkijkt
P−σkjkt
with the price index of sector k in country j defined as:
Pjkt =
(∑
Ωkt
eaijktp1−σkijkt di
) 1
1−σk
Equilibrium. Firms maximize profits, given the demand they face. They maximize:
max
q
∫
piijktdGt−1(aijkt) s.t. pijkt =
(
Cjkte
aijkt
qijkt
) 1
σk µkYjt
Cjkt
We get:
∂
∫
piijktdGt−1(aijkt)
∂qijkt
=
(
(Cjkt)
1
σk q
− 1
σ
ijkt
µkYjt
Cjkt
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σ
])(
1− 1
σk
)
(1− Et−1 [sijkt])− wit
ϕikt
where Et−1 [sijkt] is the expected market share at the beginning of period t:
Et−1 [sijkt] =
Et−1 [qijktpijkt]
CjktPjkt
=
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σ
]
Et−1
[
p1−σkijkt
]
P 1−σkjkt
It follows:
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q∗ijkt =
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
wit
ϕikt
)−σk µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
(
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
])σk
p∗ijkt =
e
aijkt
σk
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
] ( Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1 witϕikt
)
with
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)] =
1
1
σk
+
(
1− 1
σk
)
Et−1 [sijkt]
Identification. Purged quantities and prices:
εqijkt = σk
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
− ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
))
εpijkt =
aijkt
σk
−
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
− ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
))
We regress εpijkt on ε
q
ijkt:
aijkt
σk
−
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
− ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
))
= β
(
σk
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
− ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)))
+ λijk + vijkt
We get:
β̂ = − 1
σk
and v̂ijkt =
1
σk
εijkt
And
λ̂ijk + v̂ijkt =
aijkt
σk
Put differently, our strategy to identify demand signals is still valid if firms markups are
variable. This is because firms’ markups affect purged prices and quantities in the same
way as beliefs do.
Equation under test. We obtain:
∆εqijkt+1 = σk
[
∆ ln Et
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]
−∆ ln
(
Et [ε(sijkt)]
Et [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)]
∆εqijkt does not only capture the updating process, but is also impacted by changes in
expected mark-up.
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The updating process itself does not change however, we still get ∆θ˜t = gt
(
aijkt − θ˜t−1
)
,
and ∆ lnEt
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]
= 1
σk
(
∆θ˜t +
σ˜2t−σ˜2t−1
2σk
)
.
It follows
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
((
aijkt − θ˜t−1
)
− σ˜
2
t−1 − σ˜2t
gt2σk
)
− σk∆ ln
(
Et [ε(sijkt)]
Et [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
Further,
θ˜ijkt−1 = ε
q
ijkt −
σ˜2t−1 + σ
2
ε
2σk
+ σk ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
And we obtain:
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
+gt
σ2ε
2σk
−σk
(
gt ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
+ ∆ ln
(
Et [ε(sijkt)]
Et [ε(sijkt)]− 1
))
With variable mark-ups, our main equation includes two new terms.
The first term is the level of the expected mark-ups, ln
(
Et−1[ε(sijkt)]
Et−1[ε(sijkt)]−1
)
. This term
comes from the fact that the expected mark-up also affects our measure of beliefs, εqijkt. As
it is a component of εqijkt and therefore of
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
, we need to control for it to avoid
a standard omitted variable bias. Hence, we need to control for εqijkt in the estimation.
The second term captures the change in expected mark-ups ∆ ln
(
Et[ε(sijkt)]
Et[ε(sijkt)]−1
)
, and
it depends on the updating process through the change in the expected market share. It
follows that our measure of beliefs updating is now underestimated as the quantity reaction
to a demand shock is dampened by the mark-up reaction: when firms update positively,
they tend to increase their quantities but also their prices, which dampens their overall
quantity reaction. Under very weak conditions however, the quantity reaction to beliefs
updating is still positive (see the proof below). It means that in the case of variable mark-
ups, what we interpret quantitatively as beliefs updating becomes the overall reaction of
purged quantities εqijkt to belief updating. ε
q
ijkt becomes an increasing function of firm’s
beliefs, but cannot be seen as identical to firm’s beliefs. Thus, our results still provide
evidence for the updating process, but in a qualitative sense.
Importantly, the relation that goes from beliefs to expected markups (through the
expected market share) is not log linear. Put differently, two firms of different sizes, but
updating in the exact same way, will not have the same mark-up reaction to this updating.
This means that we need again to control for firm size, to be able to compare the beliefs
updating of firms with the same initial market share.
Proof. Quantity increase after a positive updating:
∂(∆εqijkt)
∂
(
∆ ln Et
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]) > 0
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First, we express εqijkt in terms of beliefs and market share. We have:
εqijkt = σk
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
− ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
))
Note that:
ln
(
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]
Et−1 [ε(sijkt)]− 1
)
= − ln
(
1− 1
σk
)
− ln (1− Et−1 [sijkt])
As we have purged εqijkt of its ikt components, we get:
εqijkt = σk
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
+ ln (1− Et−1 [sijkt])
)
Second, let’s find the relation between beliefs and market share. Market share is given
by:
Et−1 [sijkt] =
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
Et−1
[
p1−σkijkt
]
P 1−σkjkt
And expected price:
Et−1
[
p1−σkijkt
]
= Et−1
[(
wit
ϕikt
σk
σk − 1
)1−σk
(1− Et−1 [sijkt])σk−1
]
Given that we work with purged prices and quantities, we obtain:
Et−1 [sijkt] = Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
Et−1
[
p1−σkijkt
]
Et−1
[
p1−σkijkt
]
= Et−1
[
(1− Et−1 [sijkt])σk−1
]
It follows that Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σ
]
=
Et−1[sijkt]
(1−Et−1[sijkt])
σ−1 and we obtain:
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
= lnEt−1 [sijkt]− (σk − 1) ln (1− Et−1 [sijkt])
As the expected market share is an increasing function of the beliefs, we only need to
show that ∆εqijkt+1 is increasing in firm’s expected market share.
Third, we can now express εqijkt as a function of the expected market share only:
εqijkt = σk (lnEt−1 [sijkt]− (σk − 2) ln (1− Et−1 [sijkt]))
We get:
∂εqijkt
∂Et−1 [sijkt]
= σk
(
1
Et−1 [sijkt]
+ (σk − 2) 1
1− Et−1 [sijkt]
)
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It follows that εqijkt is an increasing function of the expected market share if:
∂εqijkt
∂Et−1 [sijkt]
> 0⇔ 1 + (σk − 3)Et−1 [sijkt] > 0
This condition is necessarily fulfilled if σk > 2. If σk < 2, we can concentrate on the
limiting case σk = 1. Et−1 [sijkt] < 1/2 provides another sufficient condition for the above
condition to hold.
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E.5 Product-destination specific productivity
Here, we introduce a product-destination component to productivity. Specifically, we as-
sume that the unit cost of producing good k for market j at time t is:
wit
ϕikt
1
ϕijkt
with ϕijkt > 0 and where
1
ϕijkt
can be understood as a cost wedge for market jk with respect
to the average cost of this good. Further, it could also capture differences in product quality
for the same good across markets. Finally, it could capture differences in transportation
costs between French competitors in market jk at time t.
Equilibrium. The optimal price and quantities are given by:
q∗ijkt =
(
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕiktϕijkt
)−σk ( µkYjt
P 1−σkjkt
)(
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
])σk
p∗ijkt =
(
σk
σk − 1
wit
ϕiktϕijkt
) eaijktσk
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]

Identification. Purged quantities and prices are:
εqijkt = σk
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
+ ln (ϕijkt)
)
εpijkt =
1
σk
aijkt −
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
+ lnϕijkt
)
We regress εpijkt on ε
q
ijkt:
1
σk
aijkt −
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
+ lnϕijkt
)
= β
(
σk
(
ln Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
+ ln (ϕijkt)
))
+ λijk + vijkt
We obtain:
β̂ = − 1
σk
and v̂ijkt =
1
σk
εijkt
And
λ̂ijk + v̂ijkt =
1
σk
aijkt
Our identification strategy is still valid if productivity incorporates a ijk component.
Equation under test. We now get:
∆εqijkt+1 = σk
[
∆ ln Et
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]
+ ∆ ln (ϕijkt+1)
]
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And ∆εqijkt+1 cannot be seen as updating only. The updating process itself does not change,
we still get ∆θ˜t = gt
(
aijkt − θ˜t−1
)
, and thus ∆ lnEt
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]
= 1
σk
(
∆θ˜t +
σ˜2t−σ˜2t−1
2σk
)
.
It follows
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
(
aijkt − θ˜t−1 − σ˜
2
t−1 − σ˜2t
gt2σk
)
+ σk∆ ln (ϕijkt+1)
Further,
θ˜ijkt−1 = ε
q
ijkt −
σ˜2t−1 + σ
2
ε
2σk
− σk ln (ϕijkt)
Hence:
∆εqijkt+1 = gt
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
+ gt
σ2ε
2σk
+ σk [gt ln (ϕijkt) + ∆ ln (ϕijkt+1)]
As for the case of variable mark-ups, our equation includes two new terms.
This term comes from the fact that ln (ϕijkt) affects our measure of beliefs, ε
q
ijkt. As it
is a component of εqijkt and thus of
(
aijkt − εqijkt
)
, we need to control for firm size to avoid
a standard omitted variable bias.
The presence of the second term, ∆ ln (ϕijkt+1) comes from the fact that ∆ε
q
ijkt+1 also
reflects the dynamics of productivity.
If ∆ ln (ϕijkt+1) is uncorrelated with the updating process, the interpretation of our
results should be unaffected. If however ∆ ln (ϕijkt+1) is positively affected by the updating
process, because a positive updating would lead firms to invest to improve ϕijkt, then our
measure of updating becomes a measure of the overall impact of the updating process on
∆εqijkt+1: it would not only capture the updating process itself but also how the quantity
response is magnified by a change in productivity. εqijkt would become an increasing function
of firm’s beliefs, and our evidence of the updating process would become qualitative as we
would not identify firms’ beliefs, but only a function of it. As this productivity response
could be size dependent, we need again to control for firm size. The decline of the overall
reaction of ∆εqijkt+1 to demand shocks over time, conditional on size, however still provides
evidence for an updating process.
Finally, note that ∆εqijkt+1 will also capture the dynamics of ln (ϕijkt) that is uncorre-
lated with the updating process. In turn, it could introduce some noise into our measure
of the updating process. But if this dynamics was important, it should be observed in the
dynamics of εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt. Results in section 6.1 show however that, when we concentrate
on the within firm-market dynamics of these elements (Figure 2.c), no important pattern
emerge: εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt are roughly constant over time, which suggests that there should not
be any important dynamics in ln (ϕijkt), beyond the one possibly driven by the updating
process.
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E.6 Controlling for size – robustness
This section presents additional results controlling for size when testing prediction 1.
Table A.8 reports the full set of coefficients corresponding to Table 4 in the main
text. Columns (1)-(2) include market-year fixed effects in the estimation of price residuals
εpijkt in equation (13) as models with variable mark-ups would involve. Columns (3)-(6)
additionally include controls for firms’ market specific size and its interaction with age,
introduced either linearly or non linearly through size bins by deciles. Size is measured by
the market share of firm i during year t− 1 in total French exports in value to the market
jk.
Table A.9 shows that our results are not sensitive to the measurement of firm size. In
columns (1)-(4), we measure firm size as market shares in quantity and introduce it either
linearly or through bins as in Table A.8. Alternatively, in columns (5)-(8) firm size is
measured as the log of the value exported by firm i to market jk in year t− 1.
Finally, Table A.10 includes an interaction term between size and aijkt−εqijk to account
for the fact that age and size are correlated. We report results using as a measure of
firm size either the market share in value (columns (1)-(4)) and quantity (columns (5)-(8))
introduced linearly (odd columns) or through bins (even columns).
In all cases, the coefficients on aijkt − εqijk and its interaction with age remain close to
our benchmark results in Table A.8.
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Table A.8: Prediction 1: controlling for size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Robustness Controlling for FEjkt Controlling for FEjkt
in prices in prices and size
Size Linear Bins
aijkt − εqijkt 0.103a 0.103a 0.102a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.096a 0.096a 0.096a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.093a 0.093a 0.093a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.087a 0.087a 0.087a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.086a 0.086a 0.087a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.082a 0.082a 0.081a
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.079a 0.079a 0.078a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.076a 0.076a 0.076a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.077a 0.076a 0.077a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.074a 0.074a 0.075a
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ageijkt -0.034
a -0.040a 0.019a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sizeijkt -1.053
a -1.015a
(0.016) (0.017)
× Ageijkt 0.109a 0.101a
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 1870377 1870377 1870377 1870377 1501840 1501840
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%. a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate
of the demand shock from equation (17). Compared to our baseline methodology, in this table we include jkt fixed effects in the estimation of
the price residuals ε
p
ijkt
used to identify demand shocks. ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the
number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Sizeijkt is proxied by the value sold by firm
i on market jk during year t divided by the total value exported by French firms in market jk during year t. Columns (5) and (6) include size
bins corresponding to the ten deciles of size variable, computed by market-year. Age dummies included alone in columns (2), (4) and (6) but
coefficients not reported.
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Table A.9: Prediction 1: controlling for size (robustness 1/2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Size Market share (quantity) log values
Functional form Linear Bins Linear Bins
aijkt − εqijkt 0.098a 0.082a 0.104a 0.103a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.002a -0.004a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.092a 0.079a 0.098a 0.097a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.089a 0.077a 0.094a 0.093a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.083a 0.071a 0.088a 0.087a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.083a 0.072a 0.087a 0.087a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.079a 0.068a 0.083a 0.082a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.077a 0.066a 0.080a 0.078a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.075a 0.065a 0.077a 0.076a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.076a 0.068a 0.077a 0.078a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.073a 0.065a 0.074a 0.074a
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ageijkt -0.039
a 0.016a -0.148a 0.024a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Sizeijkt -0.891
a -0.857a -0.184a -0.180a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt 0.090a 0.083a 0.015a 0.014a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1870377 1870377 1501840 1501840 1870377 1870377 1501840 1501840
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%. a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate
of the demand shock from equation (17). Compared to our baseline methodology, in this table we include jkt fixed effects in the estimation of
the price residuals ε
p
ijkt
used to identify demand shocks. ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is
the number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). In columns (1)-(4), Sizeijkt is proxied
by the quantity sold by firm i on market jk during year t divided by the total quantity exported by French firms in market jk during year t.
In columns (5)-(8), Sizeijkt is proxied by the log of the value sold by firm i on market jk during year t. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) include
size bins corresponding to the ten deciles of size variable, computed by market-year. Age dummies included alone in columns (2), (4), (6) and
(8) but coefficients not reported.
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F Firm survival
This section develops the predictions of the learning model regarding firms’ survival and
provides evidence that the exit behavior of firms on specific markets is in line with the
demand learning process.
A firm decides to stop exporting a particular product to a given destination whenever
the expected value of the profits stream associated with this activity becomes negative. At
the beginning of period t (after having received t− 1 signals), expected profits for period
t are given by:
Et−1 [piijkt] =
CSiktC
S
jkt
σk
e
(
θ˜ijkt−1+
σ˜2ijkt−1+σ
2
ε
2σk
)
− Fijk.
Of course, the exit decision also depends on the expected future stream of profits,
which depends on the evolution of CSikt, C
S
jkt, θ˜ijkt−1 and σ˜
2
ijkt−1 over time. Our assumption
of normal prior beliefs provides the conditional distribution of θ˜ijkt given θ˜ijkt−1 while the
distribution of σ˜2ijkt−1 is deterministic. So, the evolution of firms’ beliefs can be summarized
by θ˜ijkt−1 and t. Up to now, we have made no assumption regarding the dynamics of the
CSikt and C
S
jkt terms. Here, to proceed further, we follow Hopenhayn (1992) and introduce
some (mild) assumptions on their dynamics. We label Aijkt ≡ CSiktCSjkt and we assume that:
i) Aijkt follows a Markov process, ii) Aijkt is bounded and iii) the conditional distribution
F (Aijkt+1 | Aijkt) is continuous in Aijkt and Aijkt+1, and F (.) is strictly decreasing in Aijkt.7
The set of firm state variables at time t can thus be summarized by Ωijkt =
{
Aijkt, θ˜ijkt−1, t
}
.
The value function of the firm Vijk (Ωijkt) satisfies the following Bellman equation:
Vijk (Ωijkt) = max {E [piijkt (Ωijkt)] + βE [Vijk (Ωijkt+1 | Ωijkt)] , 0} (26)
where β is the rate at which firms discount profits and where we have normalized the value
of exiting to zero.8 The value function Vijk is monotonically increasing in Aijkt and θ˜ijkt−1.9
Intuitively, the flow of future expected profits inherits the properties of expected profits at
time t. It follows that there exists a threshold value θ˜ijkt−1(Aijkt, t) such that a firm exits
market jk at time t if θ˜ijkt−1 < θ˜ijkt−1(Aijkt, t). This implies:
Prediction # 4 (firm exit): Given Aijkt and t (firm age), (a) the probability to exit de-
creases with θ˜ijkt−1 and (b) a given negative difference between realized and expected demand
triggers less exit for older firms.
The literature has usually associated learning with exit rates declining with age, and
7While not very demanding, these assumptions restrict the set of possible dynamics for firm productivity.
In that sense, our results on firm exit decision are somewhat weaker than those about firm growth, which
are robust to any dynamics of firm productivity.
8Here, we assume that an exiting firm loses all the information accumulated in the past. If the firm
enters again market jk in the future, new initial beliefs will be drawn. In consequence, we treat the exit
decision as irreversible.
9See Hopenhayn (1992) and Jovanovic (1982).
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we indeed find this to be the case in our estimations. However, this relation may not
necessarily be monotonic (see Pakes and Ericson, 1998 for a discussion). The decision to
exit not only depends on the extent of firm updating (which indeed declines with age) but
also on how θ˜ijkt−1(Aijkt, t) evolves over time. If this threshold increases very rapidly for
some t, the exit rate could actually increase temporarily. For old firms however, i.e. when
beliefs become accurate, and conditional on Aijkt and t, the exit rate should tend to 0.
On the other hand, an important and general implication of our demand learning model
is that negative demand shocks should trigger less exits for older firms (prediction 4.b). The
reason is simply that firms’ posterior beliefs θ˜ijkt−1 depend less and less on demand shocks
as firms age. Hence, the exit rate may not always be decreasing with age, but demand
shocks should always have a lower impact on the exit decision in older cohorts, because
they imply less updating. Note that this prediction can also be understood as another
robustness check for our formulation of a passive learning model: in an active learning
model, no matter the age of the firm, demand shocks may trigger new investments. Their
impact on future expected profits stream should not be weakened for older firms (see
Ericson and Pakes, 1995). This prediction is not directly tested in Pakes and Ericson
(1998) because they use a much less parametric model than ours which prevents them to
back out demand shocks and firms’ beliefs. Their test is solely based on actual firm size.
To test prediction 4, note that from equation (5), θ˜ijkt−1 depends positively on θ˜ijkt−2
and aijkt−1. We want to test if, conditional on Aijkt and firm age, the probability to exit
at the end of period t− 1 (i.e. beginning of period t) decreases with θ˜ijkt−2 and aijkt−1.
We estimate the following probabilistic model:
Sijkt = αAGEijkt−1+β(aijk,t−1−εqijk,t−1)+γεqijkt−1+δ(aijk,t−1−εqijk,t−1)×AGEijkt−1+FE+uijkt > 0
Where Sijkt = 0 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if firm i exits market jk in year t.
We expect β and γ to be negative, and δ to be positive. FE include the two sets of fixed
effects FEikt and FEjkt, which capture C
S
ikt and C
S
jkt. We estimate this equation using a
linear probability model which does not suffer from incidental parameters problems, an
issue that might be important here given the two large dimensions of fixed effects we need
to include.
The results for prediction 4.a are shown in Table A.11, columns (1) to (3), and are
largely in line with the model: conditional on age, the exit probability decreases with the
value of demand shocks v̂ and firm’s belief (columns (1) to (3)).
Columns (4) and (5) of Table A.11 test for prediction 4.b. We simply add to our
baseline specification of column (3) an interaction term between age and demand shock in
t−1.10 We indeed find that the coefficient on this interaction term is positive: Young firms
10Given our need to control for all jkt-determinants here, we use the version of v̂ijk,t−1 computed using
jkt-specific fixed effects, as in Table 4. This has no importance in columns (1) to (3) as the vector of fixed
effects includes FEjkt, but it does in columns (4) and (5) as the coefficient on the interaction between
v̂ijkt−1 and age might reflect differences in v̂ijkt−1 along the jkt dimension (as we focus on an interaction
term in this case).
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react more to a given demand shock than mature exporters on the market. In column (5),
a negative demand shock of 10% increases exit probability by 3.3 percentage points for a
young firm (2 years after entry), but by only 1.3 percentage points after 7 years.
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Table A.10: Prediction 1: controlling for size (robustness 2/2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Size Market share (value) Market share (quantity)
Functional form Linear Bins Linear Bins
aijkt − εqijkt 0.102a 0.095a 0.097a 0.111a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt -0.004a -0.003a -0.003a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.096a 0.100a 0.092a 0.097a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.092a 0.098a 0.088a 0.095a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.086a 0.092a 0.082a 0.090a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.085a 0.092a 0.082a 0.090a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.081a 0.087a 0.079a 0.085a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.078a 0.084a 0.076a 0.082a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.075a 0.082a 0.074a 0.080a
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.075a 0.084a 0.075a 0.084a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.072a 0.081a 0.072a 0.079a
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
× Sizeijk,t−1 0.011c 0.011c 0.008 0.009c
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Ageijkt -0.040
a 0.019a -0.039a 0.015a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Sizeijkt -1.053
a -1.014a -0.884a -0.849a
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
× Ageijkt 0.109a 0.101a 0.090a 0.083a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1870377 1870377 1501840 1501840 1870377 1870377 1501840 1501840
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%. a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate
of the demand shock from equation (17). Compared to our baseline methodology, in this table we include jkt fixed effects in the estimation of
the price residuals ε
p
ijkt
used to identify demand shocks. ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the
number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). In columns (1)-(4), Sizeijkt is proxied by
the value sold by firm i on market jk during year t divided by the total value exported by French firms in market jk during year t. In columns
(1)-(4), Sizeijkt is proxied by the quantity sold by firm i on market jk during year t divided by the total quantity exported by French firms in
market jk during year t. Age dummies included alone in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) but coefficients not reported. Compared to our baseline
estimates, these regressions include additional interaction terms between aijkt − εqijk,t and age.
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Table A.11: Firm exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Pr(Sijkt = 0|Sijkt−1 = 1)
Ageijk,t−1 -0.024a -0.028a -0.022a -0.022a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
εqijkt−1 -0.043
a -0.080a -0.097a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
× Ageijk,t−1 0.004a
(0.000)
(aijk,t−1 − εqijkt−1) 0.033a -0.039a -0.044a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
× Ageijk,t−1 0.001a
(0.000)
Observations 4885284 4885284 4885284 4885284
Robust standard errors clustered by firm-product-destination in parentheses. Estimator: LPM. All estimations include jkt and ikt fixed effects.
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt−1 is the
belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset
to zero after one year of exit).
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G Firm growth
Our first stylized fact shows that the growth rates of quantities decline with age, conditional
on size. This decline comes from two different mechanisms in the passive learning model:
(i) selection (ii) larger growth rates for younger firms, unconditional on survival.
The impact of selection on growth rates is due to the fact that younger firms have
greater variance in their growth rates, which comes from their larger updating. Firms that
decrease in size are more likely to exit. Hence, the distribution of growth rates is truncated
from below. As younger firms may experience more negative growth rates due to the
larger variance, this truncation leads to larger growth rates for younger firms, conditional
on survival. Note that this mechanism holds only if exit rates are not increasing with age,
which is clearly the case in our data (see Figure 1.a in the main text and the results of the
previous section on firm survival).
Second, the passive learning model is also consistent with larger growth rates for younger
firms, even if we do not condition on firm survival. This unconditional growth is quite lim-
ited in our data (see figure 2.c), but is not in contradiction with the model. It should be
noted however that this result is driven by the assumption that exp(
aijkt
σk
) is log-normally
distributed and is thus sensitive to the functional form assumption. In the rest of this
section we detail the proof of this result.
Expected growth rate, conditional on size, unconditional on survival. The ex-
pected (quantity) growth rate of firm i at time t, conditional on its size, and non conditional
on survival, is given by:
Et−1
[
q∗ijkt+1
]
q∗ijkt
where Et−1
[
q∗ijkt+1
]
is the expected quantity at time t+1, conditional on the information
available at time t−1, i.e. conditional on the information received from t−1 signals: aijkt−1.
In words, this is the expected value of q∗ijkt+1, given that the shock in period t, aijkt, is not
observed yet, and will lead to an updating of firm beliefs between t and t+ 1.
Given the optimal quantity choice (see equation (7)), we get:
Et−1
[
q∗ijkt+1
]
q∗ijkt
=
Et−1
[(
σk
σk−1
wit+1
ϕikt+1
)−σk (µkYjt+1
P
1−σk
jkt+1
)
Et
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]σk]
(
σk
σk−1
wit
ϕikt
)−σk ( µkYjt
P
1−σk
jkt
)
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]σk
=
(
σk
σk−1
wit+1
ϕikt+1
)−σk (µkYjt+1
P
1−σk
jkt+1
)
Et−1
[
Et
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]σk]
(
σk
σk−1
wit
ϕikt
)−σk ( µkYjt
P
1−σk
jkt
)
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]σk
As we work with purged quantities, we label Et−1 [gq] the expected growth rate of purged
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quantities:
Et−1 [gq] =
Et−1
[
Et
[
e
aijkt+1
σk
]σk]
Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]σk
As Et−1
[
e
aijkt
σk
]
= e
1
σk
(
θ˜ijkt−1+
σ˜2t−1+σ2ε
2σk
)
(see appendix main text), we get:
Et−1 [gq] =
Et−1
[
e
(
θ˜ijkt+
σ˜2t+σ
2
ε
2σk
)]
e
(
θ˜ijkt−1+
σ˜2t−1+σ2ε
2σk
)
Note that, from t − 1 perspective, θ˜ijkt is a random variable as aijkt is not observed.
We may rewrite Et−1 [gq] as:
Et−1 [gq] =
Et−1
[
eθ˜ijkt
]
e
(
σ˜2t+σ
2
ε
2σk
)
e
(
θ˜ijkt−1+
σ˜2t−1+σ2ε
2σk
)
We next rewrite θ˜ijkt to explicit aijkt:
θ˜ijkt = θ0
1
σ20
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
+
1
t
((t− 1) aijkt−1 + aijkt)
t
σ2
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
= θ0
1
σ20
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
+
1
σ2
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
(t− 1) aijkt−1 +
1
σ2
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
aijkt
θ˜ijkt being linear in aijkt, it is also normally distributed. From t− 1 perspective we get
E
[
θ˜ijkt | θ˜ijkt−1
]
= θ˜ijkt−1.
Second, remind that V(aijkt) = σ˜2t−1 + σ2ε , so V
(
θ˜ijkt
)
=
(
1
σ2
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
)2 (
σ˜2t−1 + σ
2
ε
)
. Since
θ˜ijkt is normally distributed, e
θ˜ijkt is lognormally distributed. We thus obtain:
Et−1 [gq] =
e
θ˜ijkt−1+ 12
 1σ2
1
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+ t
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As we work with log (purged) quantities, let’s take the log:
lnEt−1 [gq] =
1
2
(
1
σ2
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
)2 (
σ˜2t−1 + σ
2
ε
)− σ˜2t−1 − σ˜2t
2σk
Given the definitions of σ˜2t and σ˜
2
t−1 (see equation (4)), we get:
lnEt−1 [gq] =
1
2
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1
σ2
1
σ20
+ t
σ2
)2(
1
1
σ20
+ t−1
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+ σ2ε
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− 1
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1
1
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− 11
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) 1
σ2(
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σ2
)(
1
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σ2
)
Note that 1
2
− 1
2σk
> 0, so lnEt−1 [gq] is always positive. Moreover, t appears in the
denominator only, so this expression is strictly decreasing with t: Expected growth rates
decline with firm age in market jk.
The source of this result comes from the functional form assumption: the profit function
depends on the exponential of the demand shock aijkt. Given that aijkt is normally dis-
tributed, exp(
aijkt
σk
) is log-normally distributed, its expectation thus depends on its variance.
Without this effect, expected growth rate (non conditional on survival) of purged quanti-
ties should always be 0, no matter firm age. Second, note that expectation is taken over
exp(
aijkt
σk
) and its variance is reduced by σk. But expectation is also taken over exp(θ˜ijkt),
which does not depend on σk. This is generating the result.
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H Belief updating and age: endogenous selection
This section presents the detailed results discussed in section 5.2 of the main text on
survival and selection bias and provides additional evidence based on alternative nonlinear
estimators. All these specifications draw on the predictions of our model regarding firms’
exit decision detailed in section F and Table A.11. In particular, exit probabilities depend
on aijkt, ε
q
ijkt, Ageijkt and fixed effects in the ikt and jkt dimensions and can be estimated
using a linear probability model.
We start by documenting whether the firms’ updating process identified in Table 2
varies depending on their survival probability. This is application of the “identification-
at-infinity” method (Chamberlain, 1986; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). We expect the
potential selection bias related to endogenous exit decisions to be lower on sub-samples of
firms, selected on observable characteristics, most likely to survive. We first estimate equa-
tion (F) and compute the predicted probability of exit by firm×market×year. Equation
(19) is then estimated on four sub-samples including respectively firms above the 20th,
40th, 60th and 80th percentiles of survival probability (i.e. below the 80th, 60th, 40th and
20th of exit probability). Table A.12 presents the results when firms are allocated in quin-
tiles depending on their raw probability of exit. Alternatively, in Table A.13 we allocate
firms in quintile of exit probability by firm-market size. In both specifications, both the
coefficient on (aijkt − εqijkt−1) and its interaction with age are stable across sub-samples of
firms and the results on the sample of firms most likely to survive (column (5)) is very
close to the full sample (column(1)).
Table A.12: Demand shocks and beliefs updating, by exit probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Exit prob. All Bottom 80% Bottom 60% Bottom 40% Bottom 20%
aijkt − εqijkt 0.075a 0.075a 0.074a 0.071a 0.070a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ageijkt -0.038
a -0.047a -0.054a -0.057a -0.069a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 1501766 1154290 839245 531182 248194
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate
of the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of
years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Predicted exit probabilities are obtained by from the
estimation of Table A.11, column (4).
Tables A.14 and A.15 directly account for the potential selection bias by including a
correction term in our estimation of equation (19). The high dimensionally of the fixed
effects implied by prediction 4 in Section F (see equation (F)) for the selection equation
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Table A.13: Demand shocks and beliefs updating, by exit probability (robustness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1
Exit prob. All Bottom 80% Bottom 60% Bottom 40% Bottom 20%
aijkt − εqijkt 0.090a 0.093a 0.092a 0.093a 0.091a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
× Ageijkt -0.004a -0.005a -0.005a -0.005a -0.005a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ageijkt -0.041
a -0.047a -0.049a -0.053a -0.060a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 753646 552923 392223 248980 120723
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. aijkt is our estimate
of the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of
years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Predicted exit probabilities are obtained by from the
estimation of Table A.11, column (4). Samples of exit probabilities are constructed by quintiles of firm size.
prevents us from using a probit or other maximum likelihood estimator and implementing
the standard Heckman procedure. In his review of the literature on endogenous sample
selection Vella (1998) however proposes a number of alternative procedures based on linear
(Olsen, 1980), semi-parametric (Cosslett, 1991), or polynominal estimations of correction
terms. We report results of these three alternative procedures as well as a standard Heck-
man estimator ignoring the ikt and jkt fixed effects in the selection equation in Tables
A.14 and A.15. Vella (1998) shows that the assumption of normality in the Heckman
procedure can be relaxed to allow for consistent two step estimation using methods based
on alternative distributional assumptions than probit in the selection equation. In par-
ticular, Vella (1998) argues that Olsen’s procedure generally produces results similar to a
Heckman two-step procedure. Instead of assuming Normality of the selection equation’s
error term, Olsen assumes that it follows a uniform distribution. Exclusion of at least
one variable from the first step is required in Olsen, not in Heckman, as the Heckman
estimator includes as a correction term the Inverse Mills ratio which maps the prediction
of the selection equation into a correction term in a nonlinear fashion (hence the correc-
tion term is never perfectly collinear with the second-step regressors). The ikt and jkt
fixed effects included in equation (F) can serve as exclusion variables in a linear procedure.
The complete set of results is reported in columns (1)-(4) of table A.14. Alternatively
Cosslett (1991) proposes a semi-parametric estimator in which the selection correction is
approximated through indicator variables. In columns (5)-(8) of Table A.14, we use 100
bins corresponding to each centile of the predicted exit probabilities as correction terms.
Finally, in columns (1)-(4) of Table A.15 the predicted probability of exit is introduced
directly when estimating equation (19) in the form of a 10 degree polynomial. The last
three columns of Table A.15 report the results of a standard two-step Heckman procedure
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excluding the ikt and jkt fixed effects in the probit estimation of the selection equation
and using the nonlinearity of the Inverse Mills Ratio to identify its coefficient. Overall, all
these alternative treatments of the sample selection bias leave our coefficients of interest
largely unaffected, suggesting that endogenous selection is not driving our results.
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Table A.14: Demand shocks and beliefs updating: controlling for endogenous exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ∆εqijkt+1 ∆ε
q
ijkt+1
Selection correction Linear Semi-parametric
aijkt − εqijkt 0.065a 0.075a 0.075a 0.065a 0.075a 0.075a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.069a 0.069a
(0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.064a 0.064a
(0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.060a 0.060a
(0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.056a 0.056a
(0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.059a 0.059a
(0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.055a 0.055a
(0.003) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.051a 0.051a
(0.004) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.054a 0.054a
(0.007) (0.007)
̂Pr(exitijkt) -0.409a -0.409a -0.409a -0.417a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Ageijkt -0.054
a -0.054a -0.054a -0.057a -0.057a -0.057a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in columns (3) and (7)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a
significant at 1%. Age dummies included alone in columns (4) and (8) but coefficients not reported. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock
from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry
of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). In columns (1)-(4), predicted exit probabilities are obtained from the estimation
of Table A.11, column (4) and introduced directly in equation (19). In columns (5)-(8), they are introduced semi-parametrically in the second
step, i.e. we included 100 bins corresponding to each percentile of the variable.
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Table A.15: Demand shocks and beliefs updating: controlling for endogenous exit (robust-
ness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1 ∆ε
q
ijk,t+1
Selection correction Polynomial Heckman
aijkt − εqijkt 0.065a 0.075a 0.075a 0.078a 0.086a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.069a 0.080a
(0.001) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.064a 0.078a
(0.001) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.060a 0.076a
(0.002) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.056a 0.062a
(0.002) (0.005)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.059a 0.072a
(0.002) (0.006)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.055a 0.070a
(0.003) (0.008)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.051a 0.065a
(0.004) (0.011)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.055a 0.058a
(0.007) (0.016)
Ageijkt -0.057
a -0.057a -0.057a -0.594a -0.595a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
λ 4.922a 4.922a 4.918a
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 1501766 1501766 1501766 1501766 1550474 1550474 1550474
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in columns (3). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at
1%. Age dummies included alone in columns (4) but coefficients not reported. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17);
ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the firm on market
jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). In columns (1)-(4), predicted exit probabilities are obtained by from the estimation of Table A.11,
column (4) and introduced directly in equation (19) in the form of a 10-degree polynomial. In columns (5)-(6), we use a Heckman estimator
which estimates a probit in the first step (omitting the ikt and jktfixed effects) and introduces the inverse mills ratio (λ) in the second step.
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I Belief updating and age: additional robustness
I.1 Extra-EU results
In Table A.16, we restrict our sample to extra-EU destination countries to check that the
different declaration thresholds applying to intra-EU expeditions and extra-EU exports (as
explained in footnote 11 of the main text) do not affect our results. Focusing on extra-EU
countries reduces the number of observations by 40%, but does not alter our coefficients of
interest compared to the baseline results in Table 2.
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Table A.16: Prediction 1: demand shocks and beliefs updating (extra EU)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. ∆εqijkt+1
aijkt − εqijkt 0.061a 0.072a 0.072a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.067a
(0.001)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.062a
(0.001)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.056a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.055a
(0.003)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.055a
(0.003)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.050a
(0.003)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.048a
(0.003)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.048a
(0.004)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.045a
(0.007)
Ageijkt -0.033
a -0.033a -0.033a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1109761 1109761 1109761 1109761
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in columns (3)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant
at 1%. Sample extra EU destinations only. Age dummies included alone in columns (4) but coefficients not reported. aijkt is our estimate of
the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years
since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit).
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I.2 Alternative age definitions
So far we have treated each entry into a market as a new one: age was reset to zero in
case of exit. We now check the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions of age.
We define two alternative measures of age. We first assumes that information on local
demand is not forgotten by the firm when it does not serve a product-destination only
one year and accordingly reset age to zero only after two consecutive years of exit. In the
second definition, we assume that firms keep entirely their knowledge about local demand
when they exit, regardless of the number of exit years; this third age variable is simply the
number of exporting years since the first entry of the firm.
Table A.17 shows that the results using these alternative definitions are qualitatively
similar to our baseline estimates. However, the effects of age – its direct effect and its effect
on firms’ reactions to demand signals – are slightly lower than in our baseline table.
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Table A.17: Prediction 1: alternative age definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. ∆εqijk,t+1 ∆ε
q
ijk,t+1
Age definition # years since last entry # years exporting since first entry
(reset after 2 years exit)
aijkt − εqijkt 0.064a 0.073a 0.064a 0.072a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt -0.002a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.068a 0.068a
(0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.065a 0.065a
(0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.061a 0.063a
(0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.059a 0.061a
(0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.060a 0.061a
(0.002) (0.002)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.057a 0.058a
(0.002) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.056a 0.057a
(0.003) (0.003)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.054a 0.054a
(0.004) (0.004)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.047a 0.047a
(0.007) (0.007)
Ageijkt -0.030
a -0.030a -0.029a -0.029a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1854141 1854141 1854141 1854141 1854141 1854141
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Age dummies included
alone in columns (3) and (6) but coefficients not reported. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of
the firm about future demand from equation (14).
xlvi
I.3 Reconstructed years
The usual aggregation of export sales by calendar year is likely to bias downward the
average sales of new exporters because some enter a given market late in the year (Berthou
and Vicard, 2015). The average growth rate of quantities would in turn be inflated between
the first, potentially incomplete, and the second (full) year of export. When estimating
equation (19), the dummy for age two picks the average bias related to the incompleteness
of the first year of export. In Table A.18, we go one step further and address this issue
directly by performing our estimation strategy on reconstructed years beginning the month
of first entry at the firm-product-destination level. The results shows that both the average
updating of the firms’ beliefs and its interaction with age are quantitatively similar to our
baseline in Table 2.
The drawback of using such reconstructed yearly data is the inability to control consis-
tently for market-year fixed effects in equations (14) and (15): introducing market×year
fixed effects specific by firms’ month of entry reduces dramatically the number of observa-
tions for which we can identify beliefs and demand shocks. We therefore stick to the usual
calendar year dataset in the main text.
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Table A.18: Prediction 1: reconstructed years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. ∆εqijkt+1
aijkt − εqijkt 0.067a 0.078a 0.078a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.072a
(0.001)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.066a
(0.001)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.066a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.058a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.061a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.054a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.056a
(0.004)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.056a
(0.005)
Ageijkt -0.010
a -0.010a -0.010a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1495774 1495774 1495774 1495774
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in column (3)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%. a significant
at 1%. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand from equation (14).
Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Age dummies included alone in
column (4) but coefficients not reported. In this Table years are reconstructed beginning the month of first entry at the firm-product-destination
level
xlviii
I.4 σk computed at 4-digit (HS4) level
In Table A.19, we use demand shocks obtained by estimating equation (17) by 4-digit
product instead of 6-digit product of the Harmonized System classification in order to
allow for a larger number of observations when estimating σk. As expected, our estimates
of σk are slightly lower in this case than in the baseline 6-digit case (a median of 4.98 and
a mean of 5.83). The results shown in Table A.19 are close to our baseline results.
xlix
Table A.19: Prediction 1: σk computed at 4-digit (HS4) level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. ∆εqijkt+1
Robustness σk at HS4 level
aijkt − εqijkt 0.073a 0.084a 0.084a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
× Ageijkt -0.004a -0.004a
(0.000) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.078a
(0.001)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.072a
(0.001)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.067a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.065a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.064a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.059a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.060a
(0.003)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.059a
(0.004)
× Ageijkt = 10 0.057a
(0.006)
Ageijkt -0.032
a -0.033a -0.033a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 1877732 1877732 1877732 1877732
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in column (3)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%. a significant
at 1%. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17), estimated by HS4 products instead of HS6; ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm
about future demand from equation (14). Ageijkt is the number of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one
year of exit). Age dummies included alone in column (4) but coefficients not reported.
l
I.5 Controlling for ijt fixed effects
The theoretical framework developed in section 3 assumes no informational spillovers,
considering θijk0 as exogenous. While our identification strategy controls de facto for
several sources of informational spillovers – the firm×product×year fixed effects included
in equations (14) and (15) account for past experience gathered from selling the same
product on the domestic or other markets –, it does not take into those from selling
other products in the same destination. To this end, we extend our identification strategy
by including ijt fixed effects in equations (12) and (13) and re-estimate aijkt from these
alternative εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt to test prediction 1. Table A.20 reports the results and show that
our conclusion remain robust qualitatively as well as quantitatively. This lends support
to our assumption that information is indeed mostly product-market specific. If shocks
and beliefs were correlated across products within destinations, the firms’ response to a
demand shock would partly reflect its belief updating behavior on other products: including
ijt fixed effects should dampen the extent of estimated belief updating.
li
Table A.20: Prediction 1: controlling for ijt fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. ∆εqijkt+1
aijkt − εqijkt 0.091a 0.102a 0.102a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
× Ageijkt -0.003a -0.003a
(0.001) (0.000)
× Ageijkt = 2 0.096a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 3 0.092a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 4 0.087a
(0.002)
× Ageijkt = 5 0.085a
(0.003)
× Ageijkt = 6 0.082a
(0.003)
× Ageijkt = 7 0.076a
(0.004)
× Ageijkt = 8 0.078a
(0.005)
× Ageijkt = 9 0.079a
(0.005)
Ageijkt -0.013
a -0.013a -0.013a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 1217810 1217810 1217810 1217810
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses (bootstrapped in column (3)). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%. a significant
at 1%. aijkt is our estimate of the demand shock from equation (17); ε
q
ijkt
is the belief of the firm about future demand. ε
q
ijkt−1 and ε
p
ijkt−1
are respectively estimated from equation (14) and equation (15) including additionally fixed effects in the ijt dimension. Ageijkt is the number
of years since the last entry of the firm on market jk (reset to zero after one year of exit). Age dummies included alone in column (4) but
coefficients not reported.
lii
J Test of stationary demand
In the learning model, firms learn about an idiosyncratic demand parameter which is
assumed to be constant over time. The initial size of a firm (i.e. its initial belief) should
be a useful predictor of its beliefs and sales throughout its life, even controlling for past
beliefs. In other words, the evolution of firms’ beliefs should not be Markov. Such a
prediction would not arise in models with ”active learning” where firms invest to increase
their profitability, possibly through demand accumulation. To discriminate between these
two classes of models, Pakes and Ericson (1998) (see also Abbring and Campbell, 2005 for
an application) propose to regress current firms beliefs on their immediate past beliefs and
their initial prior beliefs. In Table A.21, we regress the beliefs of the firms after x years,
x = 3, ..., 8, on their belief at the time of entry, controlling for the immediate lag of the
belief. We restrict our sample to firms present at least 8 years to avoid composition effects.11
Two results are worth mentioning. First, initial beliefs have a positive and significant effect
on future beliefs, and this effect remains highly significant even 8 years after entry. Second,
the immediate lag of the belief becomes a better predictor of the current belief as the firm
gets older, suggesting that firms indeed converge to their demand parameter. Both results
are consistent with our assumption on aijk. Note that these results are not sensitive to
the number of lags used: Table A.22 focuses on firms aged 6 to 8 years for which we can
include up to four lags of the belief (we find a similar pattern for firms aged 5 to 8 years
for which we can include up to 3 lags). We find that the initial belief remains a significant
predictor of current belief after 6, 7 or 8 years when increasing the number of lags of beliefs
included as explanatory variables.
11Similar results are obtained when restricting the sample to firms present j years, j = 5, ..., 9.
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Table A.21: Passive versus active learning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. εqijkt
Age definition # years since last entry (reset after 1 year of exit)
Age 3 4 5 6 7 8
εqijkt−1 0.541
a 0.587a 0.632a 0.645a 0.659a 0.668a
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
εqijk0 0.144
a 0.135a 0.097a 0.091a 0.079a 0.075a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. εqijkt−1
and εqijk0 are respectively the beliefs of the firm in market jk in period t−1 and in the first period. Beliefs given by equation
(14). Sample of firms-markets present at least 8 years.
Table A.22: Passive versus active learning: robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep. var. εqijkt
Age definition # years since last entry (reset after 1 year of exit)
Age 6 7 8
εqijk0 0.091
a 0.050a 0.031a 0.020a 0.079a 0.045a 0.029a 0.019a 0.075a 0.046a 0.032a 0.023a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
εqijkt−1 0.645
a 0.521a 0.504a 0.503a 0.659a 0.520a 0.503a 0.498a 0.668a 0.530a 0.509a 0.505a
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
εqijkt−2 0.210
a 0.172a 0.168a 0.223a 0.181a 0.174a 0.219a 0.171a 0.163a
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
εqijkt−3 0.089
a 0.076a 0.090a 0.069a 0.099a 0.075a
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
εqijkt−4 0.034
a 0.050a 0.054a
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034 41034
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. εqijkt−1
and εqijk0 are respectively the beliefs of the firm in market jk in period t−1 and in the first period. Beliefs given by equation
(14).
liv
K Profiles of prices and quantities
Table A.23 provides the full set of results used in figure 2 of the main text. In columns
(9) and (10) we additionally include firms’ size as an explaining variable when regress-
ing εpijkt on age, to control for the fact that size would affect firms’ pricing decisions in
a non-CES framework. It confirms that εpijkt decreases with age (column (9)) but not
when we account for composition effects through the inclusion of firm×market fixed ef-
fects (column (10)). Table A.24 reproduces estimations in Table A.23 on our dataset with
reconstructed years. As expected, reconstructing years from the month of first entry by
firm×product×destination dampens the initial increase in quantities sold between the first
and second year but leaves unchanged the quantity profile thereafter.
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Figure A.5: Dynamics of prices and quantities residuals: surviving firms (1996-2005)
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Note: This figure plots the coefficients obtained when regressing the prices and quantities residuals
εpijkt and ε
q
ijkt on a set of age dummies and restricting the sample to firms-markets surviving the entire
period. The complete set of coefficients and standard errors are shown in Table A.23 (columns (4) and (8)).
L Variance of growth rates: robustness
Tables A.25 and A.26 report the full set of results used to draw figure 3 in the main text.
Table A.25 shows that the variance of both εqijkt and ε
p
ijkt decreases with age. As expected,
the decline in the variance is larger for the quantity residuals. These results are robust to
controlling for the number of observations (columns (3) and (7)), focusing on permanent
exporters that survive throughout our time span (columns (4) and (8)), controlling for the
average firm size in the cohort (columns (3)-(6) of Table A.26) or using our alternative
definitions of age (columns (7)-(14) of Table A.26). Finally, columns (1) and (2) of Table
A.26 confirm that the variance of εvalueijkt decreases sharply with age as well.
lviii
Table A.25: Prediction 2.b: age and variance of growth rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ——————V(∆εqijkt)—————— ——————V(∆ε
p
ijkt)——————
Age definition # years since last entry # years since last entry
(reset after 1 year of exit) (reset after 1 year of exit)
Sample All Permanent All Permanent
exporters1 exporters1
Ageijkt -0.051
a -0.045a -0.018a -0.029a -0.024a -0.007a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ageijkt = 3 -0.110
a -0.066a
(0.004) (0.002)
Ageijkt = 4 -0.169
a -0.098a
(0.005) (0.003)
Ageijkt = 5 -0.211
a -0.120a
(0.005) (0.003)
Ageijkt = 6 -0.236
a -0.134a
(0.006) (0.004)
Ageijkt = 7 -0.269
a -0.148a
(0.008) (0.004)
Ageijkt = 8 -0.303
a -0.164a
(0.009) (0.005)
Ageijkt = 9 -0.295
a -0.171a
(0.012) (0.007)
Ageijkt = 10 -0.338
a -0.185a
(0.018) (0.011)
# observations 0.008a 0.006 0.005a 0.005
(0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004)
Observations 434593 434593 434593 44421 434593 434593 434593 44421
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses. A cohort of exporters in a product-destination market includes all firms
starting to export to that market in a given year. Cohort fixed effects included in all estimations. c significant at 10%; b
significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. 1 firms present all years on market jk. “# observations ” is the number of observations
of the cohort in the current year.
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